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SOCIOECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF RECONQUISTA
AND JIHAD IN MOROCCO: PORTUGUESE
DUKKALA AND THE SA^cDID SUS, 1450–1557

Among the results of recent scholarly interest in the “World-Systems” perspective has been a revival of the debate concerning the origins of capitalism and the modern world economy. Despite the fact that the World-Systems approach at times seems as Eurocentric as some of the theories it purports to oppose, since the origins and “core” developments of both mercantilism and capitalism are considered to have been uniquely rooted in the socioeconomic experience of early modern Europe, it nonetheless offers historians the promise of studying social structural and economic changes in non-Western societies without recourse to the value judgments and prejudices implicit in models of development that employ such terms as “traditional society,” “underdevelopment,” or “modernization.” By demonstrating that market and productive forces external to a particular regional economy and social system can intrude upon that system, dominate it, and eventually stimulate its transformation, thus creating wider changes in intrasocietal social relations, the World-Systems model has the potential of offering a conceptual point of departure of great value to students of social change in regions other than Europe during the early modern era.

Unfortunately, this promise remains largely unfulfilled in studies dealing with periods prior to the 19th century. Perhaps because of the greater relative accessibility of archival materials in European libraries, World-Systems research to date has frequently been confined to examinations of “center-periphery” relations within the European metropole itself—the main exception to this trend being studies of colonial exploitation in the Americas. Apart from colonial America, the only other non-European society to receive significant attention from World-Systems adherents has been the Ottoman Empire. Even in this latter case, however, a majority of studies have heretofore been devoted to discussions of “peripheralization” in the Levant and Anatolia during the 18th and 19th centuries and have ignored the possible impact (or lack thereof) of European economic developments on the Ottoman world during its period of greatest territorial expansion and influence.¹ Indeed, Immanuel Wallerstein, the premier theorist of the World-Systems approach, seems to preclude such studies entirely, inasmuch as he assumes that both Africa and Asia were external and, thus, largely irrelevant to the development of the nascent “world economy” throughout the 16th and 17th centuries.²

This one-sided view should not come as a surprise, since Wallerstein, in his heavy reliance upon the works of historians trained in the colonial era, often falls prey to the influence of their culturally biased and parochial attitudes toward peoples living south of the Straits of Gibraltar and east of the Bosphorus. The problems created by these biases become particularly apparent when otherwise brilliant social historians, such as Fernand Braudel, thoughtlessly revive shopworn ideas about the supposed “traditionalism” of non-Ottoman areas of the Islamic world and dismiss entire regions, such as North Africa, as mere “outposts of the East” or dependencies of the Turkish Empire.³ Had Braudel, and Wallerstein after him, been more acquainted with works drawing on Arabic primary sources from French, Spanish, English, and North African archives, they might have noticed that in the western Maghrib, on the supposedly “forgotten” Atlantic rim of the Islamic world, important social and economic transformations were taking place that were directly related to challenges posed by the developing European mercantile system. These changes resulted from the fact that the process of European economic domination along the Atlantic coast of North Africa in the 15th and 16th centuries followed a pattern that straddled the 17th-century models proposed by Wallerstein and his followers for the Atlantic and Asian portions of the World-System as a whole.⁴ The shock of foreign political, cultural, and commercial penetration in a region once thought immune to European conquest in turn led to a profound internal response that attempted to fundamentally restructure the economic, political, and ideological bases of the ancien régime in the present country of Morocco—a situation not considered possible by World-Systems theorists until the advent of 19th- and 20th-century forms of European colonialism.

THE PORTUGUESE DOMINATION AND PERIPHERALIZATION OF
DUKKALA (1450–1541)

Despite the fact that shortly before the invasion of Ceuta in 1415 Dom João I, King of Portugal, accused Muslim ambassadors from Granada of being “merchants with the morals of merchants,” and in spite of the fact that his queen on her deathbed swore the young Dom Henrique (the “Navigator”) to protect the privileged classes of Portugal from the “false witness and abusive requests of the people,” there is little doubt that the subsequent Portuguese “crusade” in Morocco during the 15th century was oriented as much toward profit as it was toward religiously sanctioned conquest.⁵ Whatever local *fidalgos* in Portugal may have thought about the rise of commerce and the attendant decline of chivalric ideals, a desperate shortage of hard currency—the demand for which had increased fortyfold during the previous four centuries—compelled the House of Avis, despite its sworn regard for the interests of the landed nobility, to share a commonality of purpose with the country’s merchants. Ceuta, long the main gold market for the western Maghrib and a favorite embarkation point for Muslim armies heading for Spain, now fully independent and militarily isolated from the crumbling Marinid state based at Fez, was the obvious target for an audacious crown and mercantile community impatient to get their hands on a major entrepôt for

spices and other luxuries coming from the Muslim East. Since 1375, the map of Abraham Cresques (possibly drawn from information obtained by Jewish Saharan merchants) had revealed to Europeans the West African sources of gold that flowed overland to Ceuta, as well as the complete northward passage of this valuable commodity to the Mediterranean via the caravan centers of Timbuktu, Taghaza, Sijilmasa, and the Dar'a Valley of southern Morocco.⁶

Shortly after Ceuta was conquered, however, this dream of easy riches became an expensive nightmare. A Muslim trade embargo, constant counterattacks by groups of *ghāzīs* from as far away as the Moroccan Sus, and the disastrous defeat of Henrique's expedition against Tangier in 1437, convinced the Portuguese that the easy profits in gold and luxuries they had hoped to attain in Ceuta were at least temporarily out of reach. Henceforward, state policy became oriented less toward outright conquest and colonization and more toward securing sources of highly valued raw materials, a policy that resulted in the directing of further expansion toward the acquisition of North African gold at its ultimate source in Guinea and the subsequent elimination of the Muslim commercial monopoly in West Africa.⁷

Paradoxically, the overall economic importance Morocco held for Portugal increased as its symbolic importance as an outlet for gold and Eastern goods declined. Since at least the 10th century, the Atlantic coast of Morocco and the Iberian Peninsula had comprised twin poles of a commercial circuit within which abundant cereal surpluses from the Moroccan coastal plains were exchanged for dried fruits, glass, finely woven cotton, and weapons from both Muslim and Christian Spain, as well as colored linens and wool from England, France, and Flanders.⁸ Coincident with the establishment of regular Guinea trade in 1455, the Portuguese attempted to reactivate this ancient commercial loop in hopes of securing Moroccan grain to supply their forts and trading posts along the African coast, as well as aiding Portugal itself in times of famine. It was additionally considered beneficial to open Moroccan regional markets to Portuguese commercial penetration in order to secure as much locally minted gold as possible, as well as to provide alternative supplies of the brightly colored woolen cloth that was such a highly prized commodity in Guinea.

The centrality of Morocco as a link in the Portuguese bullion trade with West Africa is apparent in the dates of commercial treaties and agreements signed by Lisbon with Moroccan coastal towns during the 15th century. In 1450, only five years after the establishment of the fort and *feitoria* of Arguin south of Cap Blanc in modern Mauretania, an agreement was signed with the rulers of Anfa (now Casablanca) and Safi (Asafi) to secure supplies of wheat from the coastal regions of al-Shawiyya and Dukkala. This agreement was renewed in 1455 with the addition of the city of Salé and was continued intermittently until 1468, when Anfa was destroyed by the Portuguese as a punishment for barring their ships from its harbor.⁹ In the meantime, Portuguese *feitores* based in other Moroccan towns carried on an energetic program of trade enticements and bribery, directed primarily at local officials, which eventually culminated in the formal secession of Safi from the Marinid state and the signing of a treaty of alliance between its ruler and King Affonso V in 1460.¹⁰

No region of Morocco illustrates the scope and effects of Portuguese commercial penetration better than Dukkala. Extending along the Atlantic coast between the rivers Umm ar-Rabi^c and Tansift, Dukkala, along with neighboring regions such as al-Shawiyya (the coastal region between the Sebou and Umm al-Rabi^c rivers, which today includes the modern cities of Rabat and Casablanca) and Tadla (the plains along the northwestern face of the Atlas mountains), had for centuries been known as one of the major breadbaskets of the western Maghrib. In the 12th century, when indigenous sources describing the commercial life of the region first appear, Dukkala was a land of small and medium-sized farms maintained by independent Berber peasants and village dwellers, who raised cereals, sheep, and cattle as well as fruits and grapes. Private land ownership appears to have been the norm in the Dukkala highlands as well as in the most fertile lowlands, and cooperative irrigation projects were not uncommon. By the time the Portuguese arrived in the 15th century, however, the socioeconomic structure of Dukkala had undergone major transformations due to the introduction of large numbers of Arab pastoralists from the eastern Maghrib. The previously widespread viticulture and irrigation systems of the lowlands were now gone, and arboriculture was restricted to minor enclaves in the still Berber-speaking highlands. Outside of small, market-oriented farms situated near the few towns that remained in the region, private land ownership had been replaced by tribal usufruct based on stock raising. Despite these changes in the nature of production, however, cereal output appears to have remained high; Leo Africanus reports that as late as the first decades of the 16th century, the northern regions of Dukkala in particular were quite prosperous, due to ample yields of both grain and livestock.¹¹

By the year 1500, Arab pastoralists dominated more than four-fifths of the land area of Dukkala and made up three-fourths of its population. Most were members of the Banu Hilal tribe, who were moved from their original homelands in Tunisia and eastern Algeria by the Almohads in the late 12th and early 13th centuries. These early arriving Sharqiyya (eastern) Arabs had been settled specifically in Dukkala to put pressure on local Sanhaja Berber pastoralists who were opposed to the Masmuda Berber Almohad regime. As the Almohad state gave way to the ethnically Berber but culturally Arabized Marinids, lands forcibly occupied by these Sharqiyya and later arriving Gharbiyya (western) tribes were granted to them outright by royal decree in the form of *iqṭāʿ istighlāl*, or permanent writs of tribal usufruct. A common result of the formal establishment of the *iqṭāʿ* system in Dukkala was the eventual settling down of some of these tribal peoples within strictly defined boundaries and, when water proved to be sufficiently plentiful, the gradual transformation of their livelihood from one based on sheep and livestock raising to one based on cereal agriculture. The most prominent example of such a transformation was that of the Sufyan Arab subtribe called al-Harith, who after 1515 moved into highland areas near Safi that had formerly been occupied by sedentary Banu Magir Berbers. Like similar groups later brought north from the Sus through Sa^cdid resettlement policies in the mid-16th century, these Harith agriculturalists (especially the semiautonomous faction called Awlad Muta^c) often served as military auxiliaries who aided

in the reimposition of state control in Dukkala after the Portuguese had been driven out by the Sharifs of the Sus.

Urbanism in early 16th-century Dukkala was represented by a handful of major towns, some of which were of great antiquity and significant size. The oldest and largest of these towns was Azemmour (Azammur), originally founded by either the Phoenicians or the Carthaginians and situated at the mouth of the Umm ar-Rabi^c ("Mother of Grass") river. In 1500 it was a city of 5,000 households (giving a population of about 23,000) as well as a major regional market for wheat, leather, wax, and fish. The importance of Azemmour increased greatly after the Portuguese destruction of Anfa, when it replaced the latter as the main port for the export to Portugal of wheat from the region of al-Shawiyya, situated just to the north.¹²

The most important commercial town of Dukkala was (and still is) Safi, situated on a bay surrounded by cliffs somewhat north of the mouth of the river Tansift. A pre-Islamic site made famous in the 13th century as a center for the spread of rural Sufism, its proximity to Marrakesh made the city a favorite port of call for European vessels. As a result of this trade, Safi's importance and size increased rapidly to the point where it was to become Morocco's main commercial port in the second half of the 16th century. While accurate estimates of the city's population for this period remain unavailable, reports left by travelers and Portuguese *feitores* inform us that, at the time of Lisbon's involvement in the region, Safi's produce market alone provided employment for more than 600 traders. Besides acting as a hub for the cloth trade with sub-Saharan Africa by exporting its own goods as well as those of European manufacture, Safi boasted significant dyeing and tanning works for its leather products and provided Portugal with wheat, horses, wax, indigo, gum arabic, and gold dust.¹³

In addition to Safi and Azemmour, a number of smaller towns and large villages, mostly inhabited by Berbers until after 1515, added to the economic life of the region. In 1514, the Portuguese built the fortified town of Castelo Real or Mazagan (now El Jedida) at a site they considered to be the best harbor on the Moroccan coast.¹⁴ Mazagan later developed into a military and administrative center that was to remain in European hands until the 18th century. Independent Portuguese merchants would often supplement their "official" wheat trade with Safi by calling directly at small towns along the coast, such as Tit and Dar al-Faris, or would buy horses at the large inland market of al-Madina al-Gharbiyya. The importance of horses to Portugal's African commerce can be illustrated by the fact that at Arguin one mediocre Moroccan horse (the really fine animals were shipped to Portugal itself) could be traded for between six and twelve healthy male slaves.¹⁵

The correspondence between population and the balance of power in pastoralist societies is amply demonstrated by the fact that, according to Leo Africanus and other travelers, the Arab Sharqiyya and Gharbiyya tribal groups could together put over 100,000 armed warriors into the field.¹⁶ This was a large number for a single region characterized by pastoralism and an extremely formidable fighting force in terms of the standards of 16th-century warfare. If one uses Carette's formula for calculating the pastoralist population of 19th-century

Algeria from wartime levies and applies it to the number of fighters given by Leo Africanus, a rough estimate of 375,000 individuals is obtained for the pastoralist Arab population of Dukkala at the start of the 16th century.¹⁷ The Moroccan historian Ahmed Boucharb, using population estimates of urban areas and Berber highland communities taken from Portuguese tax assessments, believes that this figure can be supplemented by another 200,000 individuals, thus yielding an estimated population of around 600,000 for the region as a whole.¹⁸

The class structure of Dukkala at the onset of Portuguese rule was essentially two tiered. The elites (*a^ṣyān*) of the region were a heterogeneous group made up of the ruling families of Arab and Berber tribes, the heads of religious orders, and the most successful members of a thriving and independently minded merchant community. Because of their long involvement in factional disputes among rivals at the Marinid court in Fez, the overt political role played by the Arab pastoralists of Dukkala was often greater than that of tribes in other regions of Morocco. This situation led to attempts by the Banu Marin to control or influence local struggles for succession to tribal leadership, which in turn helped create an environment that fostered the rule of family oligarchies, a form of political organization remarkably different from the more common "democratic" tradition of rule by tribal councils. The existence of these family oligarchies served to simplify Portugal's task in securing pastoralist support for its domination of the region, since Lisbon's agents could easily control the activities of entire tribes by coopting their leading families. One is thus led to conclude that much of Portugal's influence over the political and economic life of 15th- and 16th-century Dukkala was exercised through a clear case of status dependency, in which certain Arab tribal leaders (*quwwād*, sg. *qā'id*) readily collaborated in Lisbon's domination of extensive areas of land and large numbers of people in exchange for royal decrees of membership in the Portuguese aristocracy.

The heads of religious orders (*shuyūkh* or *murābiṭūn*), on the other hand, proved more useful to the Sa^ʿdid Sharifs, who came to power in Dukkala after 1541, than they were to the Portuguese, whom they strongly opposed on religious grounds. Presiding over extensive domains from large *zāwīyas* or ribats that were more akin to towns than to actual religious hermitages, these individuals often functioned as absentee landowners who controlled the labor of hundreds of clients and sharecropping cultivators because of a provision in Islamic law that allowed them to exploit formerly unoccupied lands by virtue of prior settlement and *mise en valeur*. This *iqṭā^ʿ tamlīk*, or "grant of possession," was usually confirmed after the fact by a decree from Fez allowing each ribat to exercise full control over the agricultural and pasture lands surrounding it.¹⁹

Another major source of income for each ribat of Dukkala was the yearly fair or festival (*mawsim*) held on a day dedicated to the memory of its founding saint, or *walī*. Like their counterparts in Europe, such fairs often played a major role in the promotion of local and regional commerce. The importance, for example, of the great *mawsim* at Tīṭ-n-Fiṭr as a locus for commercial exchanges was largely responsible for maintaining the Banu Amghar family of *murābiṭūn* in their position as spokesmen for the pastoralist population of northern Dukkala until they were expelled by the Portuguese in the early part of the 16th century.²⁰

Their place in the regional social structure was eventually taken over by the descendants of Abu Muhammad Salih (d. 1234), founder of Ribat Asafi, who, by maintaining traditional patron-client relationships with the Berber Banu Magir and Arab Awlad Sbayta tribes, soon extended their authority as far north as Azemmour.

The community of merchants in Dukkala dealing in large-scale commerce, those who could, with some justification, be called budding "mercantile capitalists," were based in towns and comprised two groups during the era of Portuguese rule. Most important to the conduct of long-distance trade were the Jews, who became prominent in Safi and Azemmour soon after their expulsion from Spain in 1492. These merchants were for the most part members of wealthy Iberian trading families who used their scholarly status and commercial connections to gain ascendancy over the small and fragmented indigenous Jewish communities of the region. Because of their multilingualism and familiarity with overseas commerce, the leaders of these families naturally gravitated toward major cities and port towns throughout Morocco, where, as in the case of the Ben Zameros of Safi and the al-Dibs of Azemmour, they often monopolized trade in entire categories of goods.²¹

The Jewish export trade in Dukkala was paralleled and often complemented by the activities of Muslim merchants, who tended to specialize in interregional exchanges conducted along inland commercial networks. It was they, for example, who regularly brought supplies of wheat from al-Shawiyya and Bu'l-^ʿAwan (Boulaouane) to Azemmour, where it was sold to the Portuguese by middlemen from the Jewish al-Dib family. Muslim merchants were also the local administrators of an extensive putting-out system for the weaving of textiles for the African gold trade, the export of which was in the hands of the Ben Zamero and Mayer Levi families of Safi. The obviously close economic ties maintained between Muslim and Jewish merchants indicates the existence of a sophisticated and well articulated commercial structure throughout Dukkala, the details of which are unfortunately not fully revealed by existing contemporary sources. It is known, however, that on at least one occasion Muslim and Jewish merchants cooperated at Azemmour to create a cartel so injurious to European interests that the Portuguese king banned all seaborne trade with the city for two years.²²

The second tier in the class structure of 16th-century Dukkala was made up of a heterogeneous group of people characterized in contemporary sources by the generic designation *al-raʿiyya* (the flock). These were the true "people without history" of the region and appear in both Moroccan and European sources mainly as statistics in times of famine, disease, or war. This undefined "flock" was made up of all "free" members of society not belonging to the elite and included traders, craftsmen, peasants, and tribal herdsmen. Within urban areas, craftsmen were represented by corporately organized associations similar to guilds and had their own respective status categories. While clients (*mawālī*) and sharecroppers (*khamāmīs*) were commonly found in Dukkala working, as in other parts of Morocco, within the kin-based political and economic systems of Arab tribes or for the religiously oriented ribats, their social position was often no worse than that of small peasant landowners. Additionally, they do not appear

to have been subjected to the oppressive patron–client dependency relationships that were the lot of *ḥarrātīn* (black client-cultivators) in the pre-Saharan oases.

As a general rule, the institution of agricultural slavery was limited throughout Morocco and, except for brief periods, was of only minor economic importance. In Dukkala, which was not a major terminus of the trans-Saharan trade routes that steadily funneled household servants, concubines, and sometimes military slaves to Fez and Marrakesh, only a small number of blacks, occasional Christian captives, or shipwrecked sailors were forced to labor in involuntary servitude. Under Portuguese rule, the institutionalized use of captive work gangs in Dukkala virtually disappeared on the Muslim side, to revive only temporarily after the Saʿdid reconquest, when the ranks of corvée laborers were filled with Portuguese captives awaiting their ransom.

Since Portuguese commercial interests in Dukkala were based on the need to acquire commodities necessary for supplementing their supplies of foodstuffs and maintaining the African gold trade, the administrative policies implemented by the *feitores* and captains in the towns they occupied were initially designed to secure a regular supply of goods with a minimum of interference. Throughout the latter half of the 15th century and extending into the period of direct rule in the first decades of the 16th century, Portuguese administrators relied heavily on the services of allied tribal leaders to exploit inland areas economically dependent on the ports of Safi and Azemmour. Occasionally, they went so far as to appoint a local ruler by royal decree when it suited them. The most notorious example of such a ruler was Yahya-u-Taʿfuft (d. 1518), a Berber adventurer from the village of Sarnu near Safi who was brought to power by a Portuguese-engineered coup that ousted the previously dominant Banu Farhun ruling family.²³

As qaʿid of the city and its rural periphery, Yahya-u-Taʿfuft was paid a yearly salary of 300 *mithqāls* (about 30 ounces) of gold plus one-fifth of the booty taken in raids conducted against tribes considered to be hostile to Portugal. In addition, he could count on approximately 10,000 *mithqāls* in bribes or “donations” from merchants and other individuals seeking his aid or protection. Apart from the profits gained from his salary and bribes, the qaʿid of Safi had the additional privilege of maintaining a private guard of 100 *makhāzniyya*. These troops were, in reality, no more than a band of mercenaries, who would assist in collecting taxes from villages and tribal lands under Portuguese control and punish those pastoralists deemed untrustworthy by subjecting them to brutal and destructive raids. In spite of the fact that these *makhāzniyya* had to be paid and equipped out of a qaʿid’s own pocket, it was not uncommon for local rulers allied with the Portuguese to amass large fortunes. It is said that when Yaʿqub al-Gharbi, qaʿid of Azemmour, switched his allegiance and fled to the Saʿdids, he left behind a treasure of more than 40,000 Portuguese gold *cruzados*.²⁴

In a departure from the policy of overt religious prejudice that characterized Christian–Muslim relations in Iberia, the Portuguese in Morocco maintained an ostensible regard for the faith and legal system of their Muslim subjects by allowing Islamic law (*al-Sharīʿa*) to continue to govern most interpersonal transactions. In reality, however, the fact that Moroccan judges under Portuguese rule had no indigenous political authority to back them up against local leaders

meant that their decisions increasingly went unheeded and that *ʿurf* (customary usage based on cultural precedent), often arbitrarily applied and in clear opposition to Islamic religious and ethical principles reasserted itself as the guiding framework for social life. This progressive de facto trivialization of the form and content of Islamic law reached its culmination in Safi when Yahya-u-Taʿfuft arrogated to himself the authority to promulgate a personal *qanūn*, or extra-Islamic body of regulations, that took precedence over all other forms of legality.²⁵

The lack of willingness by local captains to impose restraints on the activities of their tribal allies eventually led to an atmosphere of lawlessness, rapacity, plunder, and oppression that, despite the initially pragmatic nature of Portuguese rule, began to be felt as a decrease in both regional trade and local agricultural production. This instability was exacerbated in the early 16th century when the Portuguese crown ordered the resumption of *cavalgadas* (slave-taking expeditions) in the lands bordering their Moroccan possessions, which resulted in the mass flight from Dukkala of most of the region's remaining Berber population. Given the willing collaboration of both Muslim and Jewish merchants and their open acquiescence to Portuguese rule during the earlier, more benign years of Lisbon's involvement in Dukkala, it would not be an exaggeration to claim (especially in light of the disastrous defeats they were later to suffer at the hands of Saʿdid troops) that the short-sighted and rapacious policies of both the Portuguese crown and the captains who served in the region significantly contributed to the ruin of Portugal's African commercial empire by destroying the stability of the local Moroccan socioeconomic structures upon which the supply of goods guaranteeing its African trade network depended.

Although the Portuguese commercial penetration and eventual political domination of the coastal regions of Morocco were based upon trade in a wide variety of products, the main thrust of Lisbon's economic and political activity was directed toward the acquisition of grain, the most consistent supply of which was secured through tribute. Soon after a site on the Moroccan coast had been occupied or brought into the Portuguese commercial orbit by treaty, the captain commanding the nearest *feitoria*, accompanied by his pastoralist auxiliaries, would use the newly acquired region as a base for subjugating the homelands of neighboring tribes in an ever-expanding circle until the limit of his coercive power was reached. The amount of productive land brought under control in this way was anything but insignificant. The legendary captain Ataide of Safi, who, with the help of Yahya-u-Taʿfuft, frequently organized and conducted raids with parties of between 500 and 2,000 men, was so successful in compelling obedience to his rule that Portuguese influence extended for a time as far as the *hawz* (irrigated hinterland) of Marrakesh. The Hintata Berber amirs who then ruled Marrakesh were powerless to stop these expeditions, and at one point watched helplessly as Yahya-u-Taʿfuft's men insolently banged their spears on the locked gates of the half-deserted city that had once been the capital of the mighty Almohad empire.

The amount of tribute assessed by the Portuguese against a particular region was not uniform but varied considerably, depending on whether or not the tribes and villages contained therein had freely allied themselves with the crown. After

making a thorough analysis of the end-of-term reports left by Portuguese *feitores*, Ahmed Boucharb found that assessments in kind per household could vary from as little as 5 *alqueires* of wheat (from the Arabic *al-kīr*, a volume measure equal to 14 liters of grain, or by weight to 11.2 kilograms of wheat or 7.42 kilograms of barley) assessed against a community of “peaceful Moors” to a maximum of 30 *alqueires* per household assessed punitively against a group of “warlike Moors.” Boucharb found that the median assessment in “peaceful” regions approximated 8 *alqueires* of wheat or 16 *alqueires* of barley per household per year.²⁶

Although the amount of tribute exacted by the Portuguese varied considerably, these levies were not assessed haphazardly. After the subjugation of a region was complete, a census of its inhabitants was taken by the *feitore* or one of his representatives and a tax was assessed in local units of measure. The following examples reproduced by Boucharb give an idea of the variations and types of accounting employed:²⁷

1. The village of Wirs north of Safi (1510)—sixty households (*vizinhas*) assessed at 500 *alqueires* (300 of wheat and 200 of barley).
2. The towns of Iyyir and Namir—30 *alqueires* (type of grain not specified) for every dwelling plus one falcon and one horse to be chosen by the captain from each village.
3. The tribe of Banu Magir—400 households assessed at 8 *alqueires* of wheat or 16 *alqueires* of barley from each household.
4. The village of Tazrut (1511)—one camel load of wheat from every household at 25 *alqueires* per camel load, plus one horse to be chosen by the captain.
5. The tribe of ʿAbda—600 camel loads of grain from the entire tribe (400 loads of wheat and 200 loads of barley), plus three horses to be chosen by the captain.
6. The tribes of Awlad ʿImran, al-Gharbiyya, and al-Shujaʿa (1512)—1,400 camel loads of grain from the three tribes (1,000 loads of wheat and 400 loads of barley), three-fourths of which are to be supplied by the Arab pastoralists themselves and one-fourth by their Berber clients living in subservient villages.
7. The tribe of Awlad Yusuf (1512)—a tribal segment of forty-four *adwār*²⁸ assessed at 200 camel loads of wheat plus one horse chosen by the captain.

According to the tributary figures compiled by Boucharb, the total Portuguese income in grain from the subjugated portions of Dukkala and the neighboring tribal region of ʿAbda amounted to approximately 16,000 camel loads, of which roughly one-half were of wheat and the rest of barley. This approximation gives an estimated weight—based upon the 25-*alqueire*-per-camel-load figure assessed for Tazrut—of 2,240,000 kilograms of wheat and 2,226,000 kilograms of barley.²⁹ If this yield is translated into quintals (then equivalent to approximately 60 kilograms), which was the basic heavy weight measure used by the Portuguese in Dukkala at this time, the amount of grain collected through tribute in these regions comes to 37,333 quintals of wheat and 37,100 quintals of barley.

The minimum total estimate given by Portuguese sources for the cereal income of Dukkala can be found in a late 16th-century work, *La crónica do felicissimo rei Dom Manoel*, by Damião de Gois. This text, published considerably after the abandonment of Dukkala by the Portuguese, mentions that 7,000 camel loads of tax-derived grain (at an equal proportion by volume of wheat to barley)

TABLE 1 *Wheat and barley purchases at Asafi
(in 16th-century quintals)*

Date	Wheat	Barley
1491	504	37
1508-1509	27,243	—
1510-1511	8,541	1,711
1512	—	± 1,000
1515 ^a	18,325	892
1516-1519	1,025	36,143
1517-1521	29,350	—
1519-1522	—	5,859

^aIncludes purchases made in 1512.

entered Safi each year. The translation of this figure when measured by weight would then give 1,568,000 kilograms (26,133 quintals) of wheat and 1,312,500 kilograms (21,875 quintals) of barley.³⁰

In addition to using tributary levies for securing cereal surpluses, the Portuguese augmented their acquisition of Dukkala grain by allowing individual merchants to purchase wheat and barley on the open market at major ports like Safi, Azemmour, and al-Madina al-Gharbiyya. Table 1 shows available figures for purchases of these two cereals made at Safi between the years 1491 and 1522.³¹ The recorded amounts of purchased grain overlap somewhat, due to the fact that they are based on end-of-term reports made by retiring *feitores*. Since the table reflects commercial purchases only, the volume of grain was not calculated according to the 25/37.5 *alqueire*-per-camel load rate of taxation used earlier, but instead was based on the contemporary Moroccan commercial rate of 40 *alqueires* of wheat and 80 *alqueires* of barley per load. To these figures for direct grain purchases one can also add the not inconsiderable sum of 707 quintals (42,420 kilograms) of ships' biscuit assessed against Safi every year for use by the Portuguese African fleet.³² All in all, Portuguese sources, incomplete though they may be, indicate that European taxation and commerce consumed roughly 20 percent of the cereals produced in early-16th-century Dukkala.

Just as they reactivated the medieval exchange loop based on the trade in grain between Morocco and the Iberian Peninsula, the Portuguese also attempted to take over the trans-Saharan trade routes that went through Morocco by diverting caravan traffic from Fez to the Atlantic coast and utilizing the technological advantages in transport provided by their fleets of caravels. By thus making Morocco the linchpin of two highly profitable commercial circuits (grain, leather, wax, fish, and medicinal herbs flowing north to the Iberian Peninsula; woven goods, copper, horses, and salt flowing south to sub-Saharan Africa), the Portuguese were able to reap high short-term profits that in reality masked a situation of serious structural weakness. As the Moroccan reaction against foreign domination gained momentum throughout the first decades of the 16th century, what had formerly been a keystone in the growing edifice of European

imperialism in Northwest Africa became an Achilles heel, the wounding of which would eventually create economic and political repercussions felt beyond Lisbon to the Gold Coast and later (because of the decrease in gold supplies subsequent to the Portuguese loss of Morocco) even affect Portugal's all-important spice trade with the Indies.

If the Ibero-Moroccan commercial loop was dominated by trade in grain, the Morocco-Guinea circuit was dominated by trade in woven cloth, which alone made up 40 percent of the value of goods exchanged for gold at São Jorge da Mina.³³ The woven goods traded at Mina and Arguin were of four types, chosen specifically for the African market and having styles and uses often quite different from those common to the same goods in North Africa. The basic textile product traded at Mina was the *hanbal* (called *lamben* in Portuguese)—a rectangular piece of woven woolen or linen cloth often decorated with bands of red, green, or blue stripes interspersed with white, that was worn by sub-Saharan Africans as a sort of shawl or blanket.³⁴ Used in North Africa both as shawls and as decorative ground or seat covers as well as saddle blankets, *hanbals* were originally supplied to Mina from cities along the Mediterranean coast of the Maghrib such as Oran, Bône, Bejaïa, Tunis, and Mazuna. When the Muslim military reaction against the Iberian reconquista made trade with these Mediterranean ports too hazardous, the Portuguese shifted their attention to Safi, whose woven goods also enjoyed a widespread reputation for quality. The resulting *hanbal* trade at Safi was entrusted almost entirely to the Jewish merchant families of Judah Ben Zamero and Mayer Levi, who presided over a "putting-out system" that consisted of hiring local women to perform the task of making *hanbals* whose color and design were dictated solely according to sub-Saharan African tastes. This putting-out system eventually extended beyond the confines of Duk-kala proper to Shishawa (present-day Chichaoua) in the region of Marrakesh, where locally styled *hanbals* of a deep red color were produced that also fetched high prices at Arguin.³⁵

The putting-out system employed at Safi appears to have differed both from the medieval European practice of putting out to landed peasants, who wove cloth during slack times, and from the *Verlagssystem* employing landless villagers, which was common to the dorsal spine of Europe during the 18th century. It instead seems to have been primarily an urban phenomenon, only supplemented by the lesser production of textiles in villages. While many of the dyes necessary for making *lambens* for export came from Europe or Portuguese possessions in Asia and were apparently supplied by local merchant-entrepreneurs (conforming to both European and medieval Islamic models), Portuguese accounts of this putting-out system do not reveal whether or not the wool for weaving them was provided by local contractors as well. However, when one considers the evidence that ample supplies of wool, as well as a large number of specialized textile goods sold on a yearly basis for the African trade, were regularly made available at Safi during the period of Portuguese hegemony, it seems highly unlikely that purely local market dynamics could have ensured supplies of *hanbals* adequate to meet both regional and overseas demand. The most likely situation appears to be that in Safi a more highly developed putting-out system for *lamben* production was in operation, whereas in Shishawa and other outlying areas regional

TABLE 2 Moroccan textiles purchased at Asafi

	1517– 1521	1510– 1512	1508– 1510	1501	1498– 1500	1495– 1498	1491– 1495
<i>Ĥanbal</i>	137	9,700	972	17	7,325	602	2,455
<i>Ĥāʿik</i>	26,930	—	293	9,781	3,273	8,265	7,477
<i>Jilbāb</i>	104	—	—	3,232	—	10,460	12,220
<i>Burnūs</i>	—	—	—	19	—	—	1
<i>Qubāʿa</i>	—	932	—	12,452	132	2,085	—
Totals	27,171	10,634	1,265	25,501	10,730	21,412	22,412

market dynamics were sufficient to provide moderate quantities of textiles of typically local style and manufacture.

Although the putting-out system employed at Safi might be seen, from a strict World-Systems point of view, as a prelude to the eventual “proletarianization” of part of Safi’s urban labor force, it must be remembered that this phenomenon implies neither the prior existence of a landless peasantry nor any kind of “semi-peripheral” status for Dukkala in the developing “world” economy as a whole.³⁶ In the first place, the production of *lambens* at Safi merely served to fill a serendipitous niche in a much wider system of commercial relations. Second, since the entire export trade of Dukkala was ultimately under foreign control, the employment of a putting-out system could only serve to further a more general situation of “unequal exchange,” for it made the region economically dependent on the existence of trade networks in which indigenous merchants took no direct part. One is therefore led to conclude that this export trade in textiles for the African market, while serving as a welcome windfall for Safi’s Jewish merchant community and the weavers they employed, did little more in the long run than contribute to a classic and ultimately short-lived case of “colonial dependency.”

The second major type of Moroccan textile traded in sub-Saharan Africa was the *ḥāʿik* or *kiswa*, a large piece of woven cloth (either wool, linen, or cotton) that was worn as a wrap-around outer garment for women during the day and could also be used as a cover at night. Also called *lambens* by Portuguese *feitores*, these *ḥayyāk* or *kisāwī* were specialties of both Safi and al-Madina al-Gharbiyya.³⁷ Other types of Moroccan textiles sold in sub-Saharan Africa that were supplied in significant quantities but costing less per unit than either the *ḥanbal* or the *ḥāʿik*, were the *jilbāb*, the sub-Saharan African version of which bore no relation to the common Moroccan *jallāba*, but instead was a long, short-sleeved cotton or linen garment similar to the Middle Eastern *qamīṣ* or the modern Moroccan *gandūra*; and the *qubāʿa*, or short, hooded cape (not to be confused with the longer and more elegant Moroccan *silhām*), similar to those sold to tourists or worn by children in North Africa today.

Table 2 shows available figures for the types and amounts of textiles bought by Portuguese *feitores* at Safi between the years 1491 and 1521.³⁸ The totals reproduced in this table demonstrate how dependent the Dukkala textile trade

TABLE 3 *Gold receipts from São Jorge Da Mina and Dukkala (expressed in marks)*

Date	Mina	Asafi
1491–1495	2,820	2,585
1495–1498	7,257	9,967
1498–1500	3,234	999
1506	1,900	n.a.
1509–1510	n.a.	1,274 ^a
1511	1,400	n.a.

^aThis figure reflects gold taken at Azammur.

was on stable markets and consistent supplies of wool and dyes. To keep production at economically profitable levels, the weavers at Safi had to rely on regional supplies of wool that were dependent in turn on the current state of relations between the Portuguese and neighboring pastoralist Arab tribes, as well as on ecological factors that affected the number of available sheep. In the short term, a calamity such as a severe drought could have the paradoxical effect of greatly increasing the supply of wool at local markets, since pastoralists would commonly sell off their flocks for currency with which to buy food. A situation of this type is shown in Table 2 by the figures for the years 1517–21, which reflect a sell-off that coincided with the onset of the greatest drought and famine to affect the western Maghrib in the 16th century.

Although the Portuguese relied mainly on Arguin and São Jorge da Mina for their supplies of African gold, until the year 1510 commerce with towns along Morocco’s Atlantic littoral yielded supplies of both gold dust and minted gold coins whose value was often commensurate with and sometimes exceeded that taken in trade at these more famous locations. Table 3 shows receipts of gold acquired by Portugal via commerce at Safi and Azemmour between the years 1491 and 1510, compared with the value of gold dust taken at São Jorge da Mina during the same period.³⁹ Between the years 1495 and 1498, for example, the value of gold acquired at Safi exceeded by 37 percent that of the gold dust taken at Mina. Perhaps due to the closing of the Safi mint after the Portuguese seized the city outright in 1508, *feitores*’ receipts fail to show Moroccan minted gold (expressed in *doubras*) after the year 1510.

While Portuguese commercial activity in Morocco was mainly based on state-administered trade in cereals and textiles from Dukkala and, to a lesser degree, on copper from the Sus, significant supplemental commerce was carried on by “free” Portuguese merchants dealing in a wide variety of goods. By the early 16th century Safi had become a major regional emporium that received white alum from Sijilmasa, grains of crimson (a red dye made from the bodies of the *qirmīz* plant louse) and indigo from the Dar^ca oases; and cattle, butter, raw and tanned hides, raw wool, wax, and honey from Dukkala itself. Even the copper smelted at the mines of the Sus far to the south was often brought to Safi in Portuguese caravels so that it could be made into the ingots and *manilhas* needed for the African trade. In exchange for these raw materials, Portuguese

merchants supplied their Moroccan counterparts with similar bulk commodities such as "Indian" gum arabic, alum, tartar, and phosphorous for the dyes used in textile production. They also sold Indian and African spices, which included both Indian and Malagueta pepper, saffron, cloves, and ginger, as well as carnelian for jewelry.⁴⁰ Evidence of the continued functioning of overland trade routes between Morocco and the central Maghrib after the Ottoman occupation of Algiers is provided by the fact that as late as 1530, in the midst of an embargo imposed against the Portuguese by the Saʿdids, 5,500 *cruzados* (2,203,000 *reís*) worth of gum arabic and Middle Eastern spices could still be purchased at Safi by European merchants.⁴¹

A further indication of the vitality of commerce at Safi is provided by Ahmed Boucharb, who demonstrates that between the months of June and December 1512, the 1 percent tax levied on all forms of commerce in the city yielded a total revenue of 200,000 silver *reís*. The daily average of commercial transactions during this period was thus 111,000 *reís*—a significant sum when one realizes that a house could then be bought in Safi for 18,000 *reís*, an excellent horse for 2,700 *reís*, a cow for 640 *reís*, and a sheep for 100 *reís*. The *almoxarife*, or inspector of markets, received a monthly salary of 600 *reís*.⁴²

No discussion of the Portuguese domination of Morocco can be complete without mention of the European trade in Berber and Arab slaves. It is difficult to assess the actual effects of this institution upon the country as a whole in economic and demographic terms, yet numerous indigenous sources reveal that Portuguese *cavalgadas*, or slaving expeditions, contributed significantly to the ease with which the Saʿdids were later able to gather allies for their fight against European expansionism. The brutality of the Portuguese and their pastoralist clients in carrying out these raids, during which entire cereal-producing regions could be denuded of their most productive inhabitants, was soon answered by the reactive brutality of those fighting against them—a far cry from the almost chivalric warfare conducted by the ʿAlamī Sharifs against Portuguese enclaves in the north of Morocco. Although detailed figures for the number of Moroccans taken captive are not available except for the period of the famine between the years 1521 and 1522, the trade in human commodities, carried on mostly at Azemmour and at Santa Cruz do Cabo de Gué in the Sus, was large enough to be at times the main source of income for the Portuguese crown from all of its Moroccan possessions.⁴³ The number of slaves taken each year, certainly in the thousands, was great enough to make the Moroccan servant a ubiquitous figure throughout Mediterranean Europe. The legendary "Estebánico the Black" of American folklore, for example, manservant of the Spanish explorer Alvaro Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca, who searched the American southwest for the fabled "Seven Cities of Cíbola," was originally a Moroccan tribesman taken from Azemmour.⁴⁴

The yearly volume of Portuguese trade in Moroccan captives was often affected by ecological factors. A bad harvest, like that occurring between the years 1516 and 1517, could have the effect of making the amount of tribute customarily paid to the Portuguese by both pastoralist and sedentary tribes extremely onerous. The inability of members of a tribe or tribal segment to pay the full amount

of the levies assessed against them would often lead to a punitive *cavalgada*, which by plunder, capture, and the burning of crops further reduced the productive capacity of the region in which these unfortunate individuals lived. Not surprisingly, the trade in Moroccan slaves reached its peak in times of extreme famine, such as that which devastated the entire northern and central plains of the country in the years 1521 and 1522. During these years, conditions were so bad that thousands of Portugal's pastoralist allies reportedly converted to Christianity and had themselves shipped to Lisbon as indentured servants in order to eat. Families would also travel from their *adwār* in the countryside to Azemmour, where they would sell their daughters (Moroccan girls were highly prized by the Portuguese for their beauty and were often used as concubines) for as little as one *fanega* (45 kilograms) of wheat apiece.⁴⁵ Portuguese accounts testify that during these years just one of the fleets bearing women and girls from Azemmour to Lisbon comprised fifty ships, while a report from Jérez de la Frontera states that over 60,000 Moroccan females were sold at the slave markets of Spain in 1522 alone.⁴⁶ It is not difficult to imagine the long-term demographic effects created by shipments of such magnitude involving women and girls at their point of highest fertility and prime childbearing age. Some historians have even assumed that the social and demographic changes brought about by the famine of 1521–22, coupled with the normal desire of Portuguese merchants to profit from the sale of Moroccan females, was directly responsible for the eventual collapse of the agricultural economy of Dukkala upon which Portugal depended so heavily.⁴⁷

An important argument for Morocco's dependency upon Europe as a whole in the century following the year 1450 lies in the fact that the Portuguese were never completely alone in their exploitation of the country but faced stiff competition from merchants originating in Genoa, Venice, Flanders, France, England, and even Spain. In Dukkala and the area around Santa Cruz do Cabo de Gué merchants competing with the Portuguese would dodge patrolling caravels and galleys to carry on a profitable contraband trade in firearms and European cloth at isolated inlets and small towns free from direct Portuguese control. In the Wattasid domains of northern Morocco, which strongly resisted Portuguese political domination, trade remained unrestricted and merchants from throughout Europe could freely compete at the ports of Larache and Salé.

In spite of the free competition allowed to exist by its Wattasid rulers, the Kingdom of Fez had long been considered by the Genoese to be their private commercial preserve. As early as 1438, colonies of Genoese merchants were found permanently established in Fez and Asila, where they underwrote the activities of Moroccan merchants by serving as usurers, bankers, and middlemen in the profitable business of ransoming captives.⁴⁸ The port of Asila near Tangier was long used as an outlet for tanned leather by the Genoese, who, even after the conquest of Asila by the Portuguese, maintained their own warehouse and church within its precincts. Genoese expertise also contributed greatly to the acquisition of European know-how by Moroccans. They are reported to have set up commercial fisheries at Larache for the Wattasid state and appear to have been used as engineers for designing fortifications as well as shipbuilders who constructed

Moroccan galleys of war. As merchants, their influence over and involvement in the economy of the Kingdom of Fez was so pervasive that Genoese were even found participating as petty traders in weekly regional markets.⁴⁹

The most powerful of these merchants operating in Wattasid territory was Luis de Presenda, who between the years 1510 and 1515 created a powerful mercantile corporation based at Fez. It was said that his credit was enormous among both Christians and Muslims and that he employed hundreds of workers and craftsmen. Luis de Presenda conducted his commercial activities in the name of the Wattasid sultan and based his ships at the ports of Larache and Salé. A regular flow of commerce was maintained by the activities of his agents based at the Portuguese-occupied Moroccan ports of Ceuta and Asila as well as at the European cities of Genoa and Cádiz. During the reign of the Wattasid Sultan Muhammad "al-Burtughālī," Presenda was so valuable to the economic interests of Fez that he was able to eliminate his Genoese rivals Micer Ambrosio and the Doria family as well as the Frenchman Pierre Maillart, thereby gaining a monopoly over all goods leaving northern Moroccan ports. The end of his career finally came in 1527, when, while on an espionage mission to Tunis at the request of Emperor Charles V, he was captured and beheaded at the command of the famous Ottoman admiral Khayr al-Din "Barbarossa."⁵⁰

THE SA^c DID RESPONSE TO IMPERIALISM IN THE SUS (1510–1557)

People are but people, and the days are as but one;
Time is but time, and the world is his who has won.

—Mulay M'hammad al-Sheikh "al-Mahdi"⁵¹

The Portuguese became interested in southern Morocco much later than in the north, being drawn there mainly because of their need to protect the ocean route between Dukkala and São Jorge da Mina. This protectionist policy was stimulated by the increased imperialistic designs of Spain in the western Maghrib under the "Catholic Kings," who, fresh from their victory over Muslim Granada in January of 1492, perceived their country's potential advantages as an empire builder compared with its poorer and less populous neighbor. The first tangible result of Spanish expansionism on the Atlantic coast of Morocco was the creation in 1496 of the small fort of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeño, built at the entrance to the Khanfis lagoon in southern Sus. A Spanish dagger such as this—poised to cut off the Portuguese gold trade at its throat by controlling the narrow passage between North Africa and the recently conquered Canary Islands (renounced by Portugal in the Treaty of Alcobaça in 1479 and taken by Pedro de Vera and Alonso Fernández de Lugo in 1495)⁵²—was intolerable to the House of Avis, who countered in 1497 with the creation of a *feitoria* and the signing of a commercial agreement with the old ribat and trading center of Massa. This commercial foothold in the Sus was later followed by the construction of Lisbon's own Santa Cruz (do Cabo de Gué), founded as a private venture by João López de Sequeira in 1505.⁵³ Even after the removal of the overt Spanish threat to Portugal's African trade monopoly with the signing of the Treaty of Sintra in 1509, the port of Santa Cruz do Cabo de Gué remained the "key to Africa" in

the eyes of the merchant-bureaucrats of Lisbon. The trading post was eventually purchased by the crown on January 25, 1513, for the sum of 347,251 *reís*. Henceforward, any non-Portuguese ship trading with southern Morocco was compelled to hand over one-tenth of its goods to the Santa Cruz garrison. Whenever his Moroccan allies watching the nearby coast informed the captain of Santa Cruz that a foreign ship was trading in the area without permission, two caravels kept as a permanent coastal guard would seize the offending vessel, imprison its crew, and confiscate its cargo. Especially forbidden were ships bearing cargoes such as wood, rope, shipbuilding materials, and firearms that could be used by Moroccan or Ottoman corsairs to threaten seaborne commerce.⁵⁴

At the beginning of the 16th century, Morocco south of the river Tansift was a land still wild and unsubdued, yet rich in population and resources. Apart from Marrakesh and its environs, the five regions making up the heartland of what was to become the Sa^cdid state (Haha, Sus, Gazula, Haskura, and Dar^ca) had been independent from central governmental control since at least the 14th century and shared similar patterns of culture, trade, and sociopolitical organization. North of the pre-Saharan region, all of southern Morocco was mountainous and maintained large, relatively stable populations of Berber farmers and transhumants, who often paid tribute to, but were not fully dominated by the Arab Ma^cqil pastoralists who inhabited the valleys and lowlands. Because of the lack of dominant urban conglomerations in the region, it is harder to derive population estimates for southern Morocco than it is for the more bureaucratically administered regions of the north. The observations of Leo Africanus, however, whose account is based on a visit to southern Morocco made around the year 1514, provide at least a glimpse of the overall demographic situation. One finds, for example, that Haha, the most pastoral and underexploited of the five regions mentioned earlier, could put 32,000 warriors into the field from the Ida-u-^cAqil and Jabal al-Hadid confederations alone—a figure that yields, when combined with a local urban population of between 16,000 and 20,000, an approximate total of 140,000 inhabitants.⁵⁵ The region of Sus, extending from the southern slopes of the High Atlas range where it meets the Atlantic coast to the borders of the present Western Sahara, had numerous towns with more than 10,000 inhabitants and easily contained an urban population in excess of 100,000 people.⁵⁶

Despite the lack of formal political authority in the region, southern Morocco at the turn of the 16th century appears to have been a merchant's paradise. Since pre-Islamic times, the towns of Tagmut and Tazalaght in the Sus, as well as Tamdult in the lower Dar^ca valley, had been centers for the mining of copper and silver and had carried on a profitable trade of their products for the gold of sub-Saharan Africa. The chronicler al-^cUmari informs us that as early as the 14th century, before European powers entered into the Saharan trade with the establishment of the Portuguese *feitoria* at Arguin, a half-kilogram copper ingot from Tamdult could be exchanged for two-thirds of its weight in gold dust in towns along the Niger river.⁵⁷ In the 15th century, Tamdult was depleted as a mining center and was replaced by the emporium of Aqqa, located slightly to the north of the former town, where, according to a number of writers, a yearly fair presided over by the spiritual master Sidi M'hammad-u-M'barak (d. 1518) would

commence on the Prophet Muhammad's birthday and continue for two months, attracting thousands of merchants from throughout the pre-Saharan and Saharan regions.⁵⁸

Because of the atomistic political situation then prevalent in southern Morocco, local saints (*awliyāʾ*) and the heads of religious orders played a crucial role in maintaining the alliances necessary for orderly social life and the continuation of regional as well as trans-Saharan trade. Commodities such as sugar, leather, and indigo from the Sus, worked iron and iron ingots from Gazula and Haskura, copper ingots and worked copper kitchen wares from Gazula, as well as *argān* and olive oils from Haha, Sus, and Haskura, would circulate along a network of leapfrog alliances (*alfūf*, sg. *liff*) between tribal segments that could at times jump entire regions, as in the case of the famous *liff* linking the Ba^cqila of the Igezulen (Gazula) and the Ida-u-^cAqil of Haha, which was mediated in the 16th century by sheikhs of the Jazuliyya Sufi order. In such a way, towns situated on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, like Tafatna in Haha, could be tied commercially to distant caravan centers such as Aqqa in the lower Dar^ca valley.⁵⁹

Given the crucial importance of local religious leaders in maintaining social harmony in this region, it was natural that when order was threatened and trade disrupted by the activities of the Portuguese at Santa Cruz do Cabo de Gué the people of the Sus river valley and Gazula would seek to rely on these same religious leaders to free them from European domination. By the first decade of the 16th century, four zawiyas in southern Morocco, all located in towns or tribal homelands intimately connected with the trans-Saharan gold trade, had taken on the responsibility of organizing resistance against any Portuguese attempt to penetrate beyond their coastal perimeters. The most easterly of these indigenous centers of jihad was Zawiya M'daghra (often incorrectly vocalized as "Madghara"), located along the Ziz river in Tafilalt, not far from the former urban conglomeration of Sijilmasa.⁶⁰ Under the leadership of Sheikh ^cAbdallah ibn ^cUmar al-M'daghri (d. 1522), Zawiya M'daghra forged an alliance with the senior *shurafāʾ* (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad) of southern Morocco, the ^cAlawis or Filalis, and cooperated with them in mediating social relations between pastoral and settled peoples from eastern Haskura to the modern town of Figuig, near the present Algerian border.⁶¹

The junior partner of Zawiya M'daghra was Zawiya Tagmadart, then under the leadership of the Sharif M'hammad⁶² ibn ^cAbd al-Rahman al-Zaydani (d. 1517), which was located in the middle Dar^ca valley near the modern town of Zagora. Although the Sharifs of Tagmadart had great status within their own region, they were nonetheless considered genealogically inferior to their distant cousins in Tafilalt, a situation reflected by the fact that the two sons of Sharif M'hammad were to receive most of their formal education and religious instruction at the hands of Sheikh al-M'daghri rather than from their father.⁶³

The northernmost of the premier religious centers of Sus proper was Zawiya Tidsi, located south of the city of Taroudant in a large town (Leo Africanus mentions it as having 4,000 dwellings containing approximately 18,000 inhabitants) that served as an entrepôt for trade in indigo and sugar purchased by merchants trading with sub-Saharan Africa.⁶⁴ Its sheikh at that time, Barakat

ibn Muhammad al-Tidasi (d. 1511), had for a number of years led raids against the Portuguese garrisons at Massa and Santa Cruz and was instrumental in negotiating ransoms for Christian and Muslim prisoners as well as making peace among warring local tribes. Despite his reputation, however, the Portuguese, considering Muslim holy men to be similar in status to clerics of the Catholic church, refused to recognize indigenous patterns of authority and would not deal with him in any official capacity, giving the excuse that only a “prince” had the right to sue for peace.⁶⁵

The greatest contemporary Sufi sheikh in the Sus region was the legendary M’hammad-u-M’barak al-Aqqawi, master of a zawiya near Massa, who, as we have seen earlier, maintained a regular flow of goods and services throughout the region by instituting the famous truce “Days of Sidi M’barak” (*ayām Sīdī M’bārak*) and the yearly fair at Aqqa in the lower Dar^{ca} valley. After the Berber notables of the Sus had turned unsuccessfully to sheikhs Barakat and M’barak for political leadership against the Portuguese in 1509, the latter suggested that they rally behind an acceptable “prince”—the Sharif Abu ^{ca}Abdallah al-Zaydani of Tagmadart. This recommendation was followed in 1510 by a formal *bay^{ca}*, or declaration of allegiance, attended by delegations from the principal tribes inhabiting the Sus valley and Gazula, which was held at Tidsi under the auspices of Sheikh Barakat. After being formally invested as the military commander of the entire Sus region, the Sharif chose to designate himself by the millenarian title, *al-Qā^{im} bi Amrillāh* (One Who Has Arisen by the Command of God).⁶⁶

Although the nascent Sa^{ca}did state⁶⁷ that was created by this *bay^{ca}* was born with the perfume of sanctity and nurtured in the womb of tribal politics, within twenty years it was to impose upon the Sus a level of administrative centralization and organizational sophistication not seen in that region since the passing of the Almohads in the early 13th century. The initial, wholly tribal phase of Sa^{ca}did expansion, first begun under the direction of M’hammad al-Qa^{im} and based largely on the manipulation of local alliances, was to last for no more than a decade and a half. According to the Polish historian Andrzej Dziubinski, the initial confederation of the Sus and Haha presided over by al-Qa^{im} was largely an expanded version of the Igezulen alliance system, which for centuries had provided the structure for inter-tribal relations in these regions. In 1511, the Igezulen *liff*, with help from Tidsi, made a precipitous attempt to take the Portuguese *feitoria* of Santa Cruz do Cabo de Gué by storm, but were beaten back by the fire of the garrison’s arquebuses and cannons, said by the fleeing Moroccans to be “mouths of the devil.”⁶⁸

After a temporary halt in operations caused by the withdrawal of the Ahoggwa *liff* to which the town of Tidsi belonged, the Susi confederation against Portuguese expansion was reformed in late 1512 after the arrival from Fez of al-Qa^{im}’s two elder sons, Ahmad al-A^{ca}raj (the “Lame”) and M’hammad al-Sheikh (later to take the title, “al-Mahdi”), who bore from the Wattasid court the white flag and drum that symbolized their newly acquired status as *quwwād*, or military leaders.⁶⁹ With Sa^{ca}did pretensions now legitimized by what passed for central authority at that time, the earlier alliance of *alfuf* was reconstituted, with the difference that al-Qa^{im} now served as a figurehead and adviser beside his eldest

son Ahmad, who by 1514 had raised a force of 3,000 cavalry and had taken charge of all military operations. Tidsi having resubmitted in 1513, followed by Taroudant in 1514, the focus of military activity moved north to Haha, where al-Qa'im established himself at Afughal (south of present-day Essaouira), the burial place and former zawiya of the great Sufi sheikh, Muhammad ibn Sulayman al-Jazuli (d. 1465). Aided by the popularity gained from military successes such as the capture of the small Portuguese fort of Tamrakht near Santa Cruz, as well as the defeat of raiding parties from the garrison of Safi in Dukkala in 1516 and 1518 (the first resulting in the death of the famous captain Ataide and the second in the death of Portugal's Berber ally Yahya-u-Ta'fuft), the now fully independent Ahmad al-A'raj was able to pursue a policy of *divide et impera* among southern Moroccan tribes. This enabled him to extend Sa'did control first over the upper Dar'a (in 1517), and then over the Sidi Ma'ashu route through the coastal Atlas range to the hinterland of Marrakesh. The outcome of these successes was the economic and political isolation of the Hintata emirate in Marrakesh itself and its eventual cession to the Sa'dids in 1525.

Despite the military successes scored by Ahmad al-A'raj against the Portuguese and their allies in Haha and Dukkala, the real foundations for the social and economic changes that were to make the Sa'dids exceptional during this period were being laid by his younger brother M'hammad al-Sheikh, who had ruled over the Sus from Taroudant since 1514. Indeed, the subsequent history of Morocco to the turn of the 17th century was largely dominated by the actions of this remarkable man and his strong-willed sons, who, conceptually far apart from their contemporaries in the still kin-based and tribal society in which they lived, were able to guide the state they created toward an (all too brief) era of technological innovation and social change unparalleled elsewhere at that time in the Arabic-speaking world. A valiant fighter, military genius, litterateur, and innovative administrator with a keen understanding of commerce and the politics of European mercantilism and imperialism, M'hammad al-Sheikh was noted even among his Portuguese adversaries as a man of honor and inherent nobility. The *Chronicle of Santa-Cruz* mentions that he was held in both awe and fear by the people of the Sus, who considered him a "great sorcerer" able to perceive hidden realities. Because of this reverential regard for the young Sharif's *baraka*, M'hammad al-Sheikh's presence in battle was crucial to the morale of his troops and was also seen as sufficient in and of itself to ensure a Moroccan victory.⁷⁰

Because of the destructive demographic and economic effects of retaliatory raids and Portuguese *cavalgadas*, the Sa'did conquest of Santa Cruz soon became both an economic and a military necessity. Aware that European successes in battle were due to their technological and tactical superiority in firearms, M'hammad al-Sheikh and his brother initiated the exchange of raw materials for guns with Genoese and Spanish merchants, who defied Portuguese patrols to call at hidden inlets along the coast of the Sus, as well as at the protected estuary of Tafatna in Haha. To train Moroccans in the use of these firearms and other types of military technology, the Sharif hired Ottoman mercenaries from the corsair states of the central Maghrib and encouraged Christian renegades and merchants to accept Islam and settle in his domains by assuring them of state

employment at high wages. An example of the influence wielded by these *ʿulūj*, or converts, in Saʿdid Morocco is provided by the case of Yahya (Johannes) al-ʿIlj, a Genoese merchant at Tidsi who became the paramour of a daughter of one of Mʿhammad al-Qaʾim’s counsellors. When the girl was discovered to be pregnant, this Italian merchant-adventurer embraced Islam in order to marry her, entered the Sharif’s service, and eventually rose to become governor of the trading community of Tiyyut, then a major regional center of sugar production. His son Muʾmin ibn Yahya al-ʿIlj was later charged with the upbringing of Mʿhammad al-Sheikh’s sons and served for many years as the chief commander of Moroccan artillery.⁷¹

Necessity being the mother of invention, and the necessity of military reform and adaptation to new methods being of primary importance to the security of the state then developing in the Sus, it is not surprising to find that the most notable changes in the administration and organization of the early Sharifian polity occurred within the military. According to the *Chronicle of Santa-Cruz*, in the year 1533 Saʿdid soldiers, who had been noted for their fear of firearms just twenty years earlier, were finally able to use their own arquebuses to great effect in an unsuccessful assault against the Portuguese garrison. Only a last-ditch effort—a wall of mattresses erected by the wives of the defenders—saved the fort from being taken.⁷² As early as 1529, siege engines (*petrechos*) were being constructed in southern Morocco under the supervision of Ottoman specialists, and in 1539, a Morisco refugee from Madrid was reported to be casting bronze cannons at Marrakesh.⁷³ Although the initial date for this development cannot be accurately specified, it is clear that Moroccan cannons were being cast at Taroudant as early as 1534. In 1541, the final (and successful) Saʿdid assault on Santa Cruz do Cabo de Gué was undertaken with “forty to fifty” pieces of field artillery plus a great number of bombards, including six large “Mimunas” (Ar. *maymūna*), probably named in part after a noted *jiniyya* of Moroccan folklore.⁷⁴ These massive 420-mm. guns were cast at the site of the siege itself and hurled heavy stone projectiles 1.37 meters in circumference. The army supported by these cannons was estimated by Santa Cruz’s Portuguese defenders to have included 20,000 spear-carrying infantry, 40,000 arquebusiers, 12,000 crossbowmen, and 50,000 porters and sappers. One is less apt to ascribe this number to exaggeration after learning that the captain of Santa Cruz, Don Gutierrez de Monroy, requested 20,000 reinforcements from Portugal (almost ten times the number of the actual garrison) to defend his position against the Moroccan assault.⁷⁵

In addition to the acquisition by Mʿhammad al-Sheikh of heavy field artillery and the technology involved in casting cannons and firearms from Europe and the Ottoman Empire, strictly Moroccan innovations in the art of war prior to the capture of Santa Cruz included the creation of a transport and sapper corps. The members of this unit, which eventually became the logistical backbone of the Saʿdid army, were called “mountaineers” (Ber. *ibūdrāren*) because they were drawn primarily from the Ida-u-ʿAqil and Ida-u’l-Tit confederations of Haha and the Anti-Atlas. Other Moroccan innovations that came to light during these years included a ten-barreled bombard and light cannon that could be disassembled and mounted on muleback. The most famous Saʿdid military innova-

tion, however, was the creation of the *Jaysh al-Asbāhiyya* ("Army of Sipahis"), who bore no relation to their lightly armed Ottoman namesakes but were instead a regiment of mounted arquebusiers, whose role in battle has caused Dziubinski to regard them as forerunners of the dragoons of 17th- and 18th-century Europe. The Moroccan Asbahiyya, commanded by M'hammad al-Sheikh's posthumous son Ahmad al-Mansur, were to prove instrumental in the crushing defeat inflicted by the Saʿdids against the Portuguese army at the battle of Wadi al-Makhazin (also called the battle of Alcazarquivir or the "Battle of the Three Kings") in 1578.⁷⁶

Traditional patterns of internal and external trade were not only disrupted by the effects of war in the Sus, but were also compromised by the enmity of the Wattasid sultans in Fez, who, when they finally understood the true extent of Saʿdid aspirations, attempted to embargo all north-south commerce between the Atlantic Ocean and Oujda on the present Moroccan-Algerian border. As if that were not enough, the rulers of Fez also opened up a second military front against the Sharifs in Dukkala and Tadla and even went so far as to reach a *rapprochement* with their sworn enemies the Portuguese soon after Ahmad al-Aʿraj occupied Marrakesh in 1525. True to form, however, M'hammad al-Sheikh was soon able to turn this added threat into a new advantage by securing and broadening the traditional commercial ties of southern Morocco with the emporia of sub-Saharan Africa. Even more important, he compensated for the lost markets of northern Morocco and the eastern Maghrib by orienting his trade policy toward the Atlantic Ocean and seaborne commerce with Western Europe.

After the newly "liberated" port of Santa Cruz (now renamed Agadir by its Susi conquerors) was made available for commercial use in the latter part of 1541, the Saʿdid regime in southern Morocco directed most of its overseas political and economic activities toward the so-called "core" states of Europe, much as Dukkala had been forced to do under Portuguese domination fifty years earlier. From the world systems perspective, it is not unreasonable to speculate that M'hammad al-Sheikh and his "renegade" advisers fully understood that as long as Morocco remained cut off from European markets there was no chance for it to acquire the technology and expertise necessary for internal socioeconomic reforms and development. Also, given the impetus toward mercantile imperialism and colonial expansion on the part of the states of the Iberian peninsula, if Morocco did not make itself valuable to other kingdoms that were powerful enough to blunt the Iberian threat, the Sharif's country would in the future find itself ravished by all who came to its shores. Despite its "modern" appearance, however, in actual practice this "Atlantic" policy of M'hammad al-Sheikh can be seen to resemble nothing so much as an overseas extension of the traditional Susi *liff* alliances. Just as the Igezulen would jump over their neighbors the Ahoggwa to ally themselves with the more distant Ida-u-ʿAqil of Haha, so Saʿdid Morocco as a whole leapfrogged the nearby and potentially threatening kingdoms of Spain and Portugal to deal instead with England, France, and the Protestant Low Countries.⁷⁷

To win at this game, however, and to move toward the creation of an internally unified, administratively centralized regional power (what Wallerstein would call a "semi-periphery"), it was essential that all trade relationships be subservient

to Morocco's own interests. Once the tribes of Sus were subdued and his brother was safely confined to Marrakesh, M'hammad al-Sheikh sought to reestablish the trans-Saharan trade network, which had been disrupted by Portuguese and bedouin raids since 1517. In the winter of 1543–44, the Sharif led a force of 1,800 cavalry through Saqiyat al-Hamra³ in the Western Sahara to Waddan in the Adrar region of Mauretania. Along the way, he attempted to forge alliances with the chiefs of the major Saharan Arab tribes (the Banu Sulaym, al-Udaya, and Awlad Dlim), in order to use their power to protect future caravans from the depredations of the Desert Sanhaja and Tuareg, who, allied with Askiya Ishaq I of Songhay, collected tolls along the central trade routes from Dar^ca and Sijilmasa to Timbuktu. The object of this expedition appears to have been the salt mines of Ijil, two stages to the northwest of Waddan, which provided a product much purer than that mined at the more famous oasis of Taghaza in the central Sahara.⁷⁸ By seizing Ijil and allying himself with the tribes of Saqiyat al-Hamra³, M'hammad al-Sheikh was thus able to reopen the ancient coastal trade route, or *Ṭarīq Lamtūnī*, which had not been regularly used since Almoravid times. A major secondary benefit of the reopening of this route was the fact that it undermined the economic livelihood (as well as the political significance) of his rivals, the Filali Sharifs of Sijilmasa, by diverting much of the flow of Sudanese gold from the Taghaza-Sijilmasa axis to Laktawa and Zagora in the Dar^ca valley. M'hammad al-Sheikh's success in implementing this policy is illustrated by the fact that both Laktawa and Zagora served as mints for Sa^cdid gold dinars throughout the 16th century.⁷⁹

With a significant portion of the gold that flowed annually from Timbuktu to the Maghrib now diverted toward the Sus and competition from the salt-pans of Taghaza partly neutralized because of new supplies of salt from Ijil, M'hammad al-Sheikh at last found himself in possession of the resources necessary to develop the full export potential of southern Morocco and able to embark upon his long-held program for the reunification of the country as a whole. The first step that had to be taken in this regard was the removal of his brother, still nominally head of the Sa^cdid state, from his splendid yet isolated position at Marrakesh. Cut off from the crucial economic and political support of the Sus and dependent instead on the marginal tribal region of Haha and the *hawz* of Marrakesh, Ahmad al-A^craj stood helpless before his inevitable removal. The final break between the two brothers was precipitated soon after M'hammad al-Sheikh's conquest of Santa Cruz in the spring of 1541, when the younger sibling refused to accede to his elder's demand for the one-fifth share of booty due to a ruler under Islamic law. In reaction to this impudent assertion of autonomy, Ahmad al-A^craj made the hasty and ultimately fatal mistake of formally appointing his son as his successor, thus bypassing his younger brother and breaking a death-bed promise made to their father, M'hammad al-Qa³im, that succession should pass to the eldest surviving male relative. The result of this act was a short but bitter war in which the numerically superior cavalry forces of Marrakesh were smashed by the arquebus and cannon fire of the army of the Sus. After another stunning victory of Susi arms at al-Qahira near Marrakesh in June 1544, Ahmad al-A^craj was deposed and sent into exile among the Filali Sharifs in Sijilmasa,

where he futilely continued to advocate the superior legitimacy of himself and his family until the end of his life.⁸⁰

Now that southern Morocco was finally subdued and the ports of Santa Cruz and Safi (abandoned by King João III of Portugal as a consequence of the fall of Santa Cruz) were once again in Moroccan hands and available for unrestricted commerce, M'hammad al-Sheikh could think about conducting an effective policy of foreign trade. Because of its humid climate and the abundance of usable water, the Sus region had been a center for the production and export of unrefined sugar since at least the 11th century. According to Portuguese documents, shortly after assuming authority over the Susi *alfuf* in 1510, M'hammad al-Qa'im initiated the exchange of locally produced sugar for Castilian firearms, taking this commodity from fields located in the Sus valley proper, around the towns of Tiyyut and Tidsi.⁸¹ The amount of land under cultivation quickly expanded as a result of this trade; by the year 1516 vast plantations of sugar cane could be found surrounding the revitalized city of Taroudant. The early acquisition of up-to-date production technologies in the region is revealed by the fact that prior to 1541 refined white sugar (now traded by the Sa'ids to a number of countries for numerous products besides firearms) had begun to replace the raw sugar and molasses that had previously made up the bulk of trade in this commodity. According to the Spanish captive Luis del Mármol Caravajal, the introduction of European sugar-refining techniques was the legacy of a Jew who had emigrated to Morocco and embraced Islam.⁸²

Detailed information on the administration and organization of the Moroccan sugar industry seems not to have survived the ravages of time. Evidence suggests, however, that the sugar plantations of the Sus valley were true latifundia, employing wage laborers who lived in nearby villages, and that they were more often than not owned by Andalusian Jewish merchants or their *'iljī* (converted Christian) counterparts. Certain of these plantations, such as most of those found in the region of Taroudant and in areas not previously given over to sugar cane agriculture, were the private property of the Sharif himself. Unlike the case with the sugar plantations operated by the Portuguese in Brazil, slave labor seems not to have been a significant component in the Moroccan system of export-oriented agricultural production. According to Marmól, the majority of plantation workers were Berber peasants, who worked in the cane fields to earn hard currency as landless laborers.⁸³ The existence of this handy labor pool was a great boon to the Sharif, since Susi cultivators brought with them a relatively high level of technical expertise due to their traditional use of field terracing and irrigation.

The *ingenios*, or sugar refineries themselves, were apparently owned and operated by the state, their use being rented by sugar producers in return for a share of future shipments of European cloth and other commodities. Recent excavations undertaken at the refinery complex established by Ahmad al-Mansur near Shishawa in the *hawz* of Marrakesh indicate that, for their time, Moroccan refineries were large industrial enterprises and utilized extensive millworks that took up hundreds of meters of space. At Shishawa, enough workers were employed to make up a town sufficient to support two public baths as well as a

number of *funduqs*, or hostelrys. Moroccan and European merchants would take delivery of the sugar produced at this site and transport it to Safi, where it would be shipped to England, France, the Low Countries, and the Hanseatic states. A relatively high standard of living at Shishawa is revealed by the presence of a large potters' quarter, which provided wares for use by the families of refinery workers. The refinery and its attached town were irrigated by fifteen canals that diverted most of the water of the Shishawa river and provided a flow (estimated at more than 2,000 liters per second) strong enough to turn two grinding mills, supply the public baths, and nourish sizeable local fields of both sugar cane and olives, as well as lesser amounts of wheat, barley, cotton, and artichokes.⁸⁴

Sales of sugar provided the backbone for an extensive trade in the agricultural products of the Sus before large-scale, state-conducted trade in copper and saltpeter was initiated in the second half of the 16th century. An example of the types and amounts of goods shipped to Europe from the Sus during this period is provided by a later tally for tax purposes made by English Barbary Company merchants for the fiscal year 1574–75, when Moroccan–English trade was still in its infant stages. The total value of the commodities received at London during this year amounted to £28,639 sterling and included: 2,068 chests of refined sugar (at 300 pounds each, yielding a total of 620,400 pounds or 4,700 quintals); 585 hogsheads of “pannellis” (unrefined sugar); 604 quintals of almonds; 217 tons of molasses; 52 quintals of anise seed; 190 ostrich feathers (from sub-Saharan Africa); 120 quintals of dates; 600 pounds of marmalade (made from either apricots or oranges); 1,400 pounds of “suckettes” (hard sugar candies); and 3,200 goat skins.⁸⁵

English interest in Morocco was first aroused in the 1540s, when advisers to Henry VIII noticed the advantages France was beginning to reap from its purchases of Moroccan copper and iron for making firearms. It seems that even at this early date the English had toyed with the idea of establishing formal diplomatic and commercial ties that might lay the groundwork for an eventual alliance between Muslim North Africa and Protestant Europe.⁸⁶ In 1551, the tall ship *Lion* of London under Thomas Windham made the first English commercial voyage to Morocco, a trip repeated the following year when three other English ships unloaded linens, woolen cloth, coral, amber, and jet at Safi and picked up sugar, dates, almonds, molasses, and sugar syrup at Agadir.⁸⁷

Details of the French copper trade with southern Morocco, if they were available, would present a picture quite different from the trade in commodities for the elite initiated at first by the English. It is known, for example, that a mutual need by France and Morocco for bronze cannons resulted, by the 1530s, in an exchange of French tin for Moroccan copper that was later expanded to include iron.⁸⁸ Writings of contemporary Moroccan chroniclers clearly reveal that copper production in the Sus region increased significantly prior to the fourth decade of the 16th century. Shortly after occupying Marrakesh in 1525, Ahmad al-A^craj traveled to the old mining center of Tamdult in the lower Dar^ca valley, where, with the help of a local Sufi named Ibrahim ibn ^cAbd al-Wafi al-Marqushi

(known today as "Sidi Brahim Manqush"), he forcibly settled more than 600 families of local tribespeople who had been suffering from the effects of a drought and put them to work as wage laborers in the newly reopened copper mines.⁸⁹

A detail often ignored in works dealing with Sa^cdid Morocco, yet extremely important in light of M'hammad al-Sheikh's burning desire to make his country into a regional power, is the Sharif's emphasis on the construction of a Moroccan wartime and merchant fleet.⁹⁰ There is plentiful evidence in both Moroccan and European primary sources that the Sa^cdids fully understood the limitations under which their country labored by not having an active maritime presence. By the time of the battle of Wadi al-Makhazin in 1578, at least four major reasons were seen as providing compelling arguments for a policy of fleet expansion.

First, a strong fleet could serve as a primary line of defense that would protect the northern coastal plains of Morocco from the activities of Spanish and Portuguese corsairs, who were to play an important role in Phillip II's eventual policy of keeping the Sharifian state off balance. Second, a fleet would lessen Morocco's susceptibility to economic blockade by either the Iberians or the Ottomans and could, if well-employed, wreak havoc on enemy forces during landing operations along the coast. Third, a fleet would enhance Morocco's own ability to blockade and eventually conquer the coastal enclaves still remaining in European hands and prevent their garrisons from disrupting the economic and social life of neighboring regions. Finally, the Sharifs seem to have been fully aware that as long as Moroccan merchandise continued to be carried only in foreign ships their country would be forced to remain dependent upon Europe and would ultimately be unable to chart its own destiny.⁹¹

Operations conducted by Sharifian warships date at least as far back as 1537, when the Moroccans captured four *zabras* (Biscayan brigantines used for fishing) off Tafatna, armed them, and used them to interdict Portuguese traffic to and from Santa Cruz do Cabo de Gué.⁹² Actual naval construction, however, began only after 1547, when a truce signed between the Sublime Porte, Emperor Charles V, the Pope, France, and Venice freed more than 1,000 Ottoman sailors to take up service in Morocco along with a considerable number of Genoese converts. Between the years 1549 and 1550, M'hammad al-Sheikh ordered the creation of the Sa^cdid state's first naval arsenal at Salé, where spruce, cedar, and pine from the forests around Badis on the Mediterranean coast were used to build four large galleasses of twenty benches of oars each. By 1550 a Moroccan squadron based at Larache could boast eight large galleasses (with dimensions of 150 feet by 20 feet and manned by 350 oarsmen), two brigantines, and one large foist (*fuste*). Two more foists were built at Salé in 1556.⁹³

Prior to his conquest of Fez, M'hammad al-Sheikh unsuccessfully approached the Wattasid pretender, Bu Hassun, then reigning independently over Badis as an Ottoman client, for a treaty of alliance that had as one of its terms mutual collaboration in the construction of more than 100 galleys, *tafureas* (round ships), and barks that would be used in an assault upon Ceuta. Despite the rejection of these ambitious plans, the Sharif was nonetheless able to proceed with his own program of naval construction, and by the time of his death had built a fleet

(based at Salé, Larache, and Agadir) of thirty foists and large galleys. By 1577, the number of Moroccan naval vessels had increased to forty galleys alone, approximately equal in strength to the corsair fleet at Algiers.⁹⁴

During the same period, the Moroccans possessed a number of their own merchant vessels, owned and operated primarily by Iberian Jewish refugees, which sailed from the ports of Larache and Salé. A letter from M'hammad al-Sheikh's successor 'Abdallah al-Ghalib Bi'llah (d. 1574) to Queen Elizabeth I of England dated October 1569, requests unimpeded passage for ships operated by the *marranos* Luis Fernández and Salvador Nunes, who, flying the Sharifian flag, apparently sailed to Antwerp on a regular basis. Although the existence of a stable trade in commodities carried by Moroccan ships is hinted at in this letter, available sources unfortunately give no indication of the types or volumes of the cargoes they contained.⁹⁵

The establishment of stable and expanding overseas markets for goods from the Sus as well as the technological, organizational, and administrative changes initiated by M'hammad al-Sheikh gave Sa'ḍid Morocco a decisive advantage in its struggle with the Marinid–Wattasid polity to the north. Politically fragmented, institutionally archaic, much more dependent than their rivals upon the agents of foreign states for expertise (Genoese merchants such as Luis de Presenda bankrolled the regime in Fez and monopolized external commerce, while a relatively small contingent of Ottoman mercenaries gave the Wattasid army the only technologically modern forces it possessed), and bereft of an acceptable unifying ideology, this pale remnant of the once powerful Marinid tribal dynasty managed to survive in the first half of the 16th century primarily by allying itself with local interest groups that stood to decline in influence if the Sa'ḍids took power.

Unfortunately for the interests of these groups, however, the expansion of Sa'ḍid power proved to be unstoppable. Shortly after the Sharifs of the Sus had successfully driven the Portuguese out of their *feitorias* in southern Morocco, piece after piece of Moroccan territory began to be detached from the nominal or actual control of Fez and was added to the constellation of regions clustered about Marrakesh. The eventual outcome of this gradual disintegration of Wattasid domains and their absorption into the Sa'ḍid polity could have been predicted as early as 1536, when, even before the expulsion of the Portuguese from Santa Cruz, Sharifian forces decisively defeated the Wattasid army at the battle of Bu 'Aqaba and took possession of the rich grain producing region of Tadla, thus effectively dividing Morocco into two separate kingdoms. The fiscally motivated Portuguese withdrawal in 1541 from the cities of Safi and Azemmour after the loss of Santa Cruz ensured Sa'ḍid possession of the most important commercial ports on the Atlantic coast and added the threat of economic strangulation to military defeat for the beleaguered Wattasids. In order to forestall the imminent creation of a tripartite Spanish–Portuguese–Wattasid alliance, M'hammad al-Sheikh wasted no time in striking northward at Fez itself, emerging victorious at the battle of Darna in September 1545, and taking the sultan of Fez as his prisoner. Two years later, in 1547, this hapless ruler was allowed to return to his domains only after ceding to the Sa'ḍids the plains of the Gharb and the city of Meknès, no more than 60 kilometers from Fez itself. By the following

year, most of northern Morocco had accepted the inevitability of a change in both regime and governing ideology. In the type of cruel irony so common to Moroccan history, the final assault of Saʿdid forces on Fez (successfully carried out on February 18, 1549) was assisted by a number of the Wattasid ruler's closest "allies."⁹⁶

By the time of his murder in October 1557, at the hands of Turkish assassins sent by the Ottoman sultan Süleiman the Magnificent, M'hammad al-Sheikh had the satisfaction of presiding over a Morocco that gave the promise of becoming more unified and more powerful than at any time since the early 14th century. His capture of Fez had forced the Portuguese out of the coastal towns of Asila and al-Qasr al-Saghir, leaving only the isolated fortress of Mazagan and the now minor enclaves of Tangier and Ceuta in Christian hands. His suppression of the Sufis of northern Morocco, as well as those mystics acting too autonomously in the region of Marrakesh, left him unopposed as both ruler and religious spokesman for his people (he now called himself *khalifa*, or "caliph," claiming, by his Arab origins and Prophetic descent, the sole legitimate right to rule the Muslims of North Africa in place of the Ottoman "usurpers").⁹⁷ To the economic resources of the Sus could now be added wheat from Tadla, flocks of sheep from the Gharb, olives and olive oil from the regions of Fez and Meknès, iron from Tafilalt, Dabdu, and Melilla, tin from the hinterlands of Salé, and newly discovered saltpeter from Sus and Shyadma. Furthermore, three caravan routes were now open across the Sahara. To the Timbuktu-Laktawa route reopened earlier were later added the traditional main caravan road from Gao via Tuwat and Sijilmasa (apparently revived after the Filali Sharifs of Sijilmasa had acquiesced to Saʿdid hegemony), as well as another from Jenné via Waddan to Tagust in the Sus.⁹⁸ The political and economic possibilities that lay open to Morocco now presented an enormous opportunity to M'hammad al-Sheikh, but it was to be his sons, not he, who oversaw their partial realization.

MOROCCO AND THE 16TH-CENTURY "WORLD-SYSTEM"

Given the data presented, what can the modern researcher conclude about the socioeconomic transformations occurring in Morocco during the late 15th and early 16th centuries? What can the case of this relatively small and initially divided country, partially occupied by a foreign power and striving to maintain its independence in the face of serious Iberian and Ottoman threats to its existence, contribute to the controversies surrounding the development of the "world" economic system?

First of all, the preceding discussion should have clearly demonstrated that, contrary to the assumptions of most World-Systems theorists, European trade with the western Maghrib was not established primarily as a means for obtaining luxury goods. Indeed, trade figures from Dukkala reveal that gold, the apparent *bête noire* of early Portuguese merchants, was only of secondary importance to Lisbon's agents in Morocco and, although it provided a welcome supplementary income in certain years, made up an insignificant part of their remittances after the year 1510. Other than gold, Morocco had relatively little to offer Europe in

the way of luxury goods. Instead, it supported the nascent 16th-century European “imperium”⁹⁹ by providing what today would be called “basic commodities”—wheat and barley, slaves, copper, iron, sugar, and eventually saltpeter. Far from being “outside of the loop” and hence irrelevant to the developing European economic system as Wallerstein and his followers have heretofore supposed, the cases of both Dukkala and the Sus reveal that Morocco exhibited during this period a classic example of what might be termed “inclusion” and “peripheralization” within the European commercial orbit.¹⁰⁰

In the case of Portuguese-dominated Dukkala, European political and economic supremacy was nearly total, encompassing the productive, commercial, and financial dimensions of local society.¹⁰¹ For the Saʿdid domains of southern Morocco, however, the hegemonic domination exercised by the European “core” states was much less pronounced, due largely to the fact that the superior defensive position, greater resources, population, and economic integration of the Sus allowed this region to become a player in the intense competition between states that accompanied the first phase of European economic expansion between the years 1450 and 1520. The resulting network of Eurocentered “international” commercial relations, assumed by Terrence Hopkins to expand “by invitation” only,¹⁰² allowed the rapidly developing Saʿdid polity to participate as a sort of “junior partner,” as England, the Low Countries, and France sought Moroccan raw materials (particularly copper and saltpeter) for their struggle against Spain and purchased large amounts of refined sugar to supply a growing consumer demand. If the classic World-Systems model is to be believed, the Saʿdid rulers and their advisers might even be seen as desiring the establishment of “peripheries” of their own—an attitude which may have been reflected in Moroccan designs against Ottoman possessions in the central Maghrib and Ahmad al-Mansur’s conquest of Songhay at the end of the century.¹⁰³

Additionally, from the late 15th century until the advent of the 17th century, Morocco was clearly becoming part of a growing network of “protocapitalist” relations.¹⁰⁴ The intense competition for Moroccan trade first instigated by Portugal and Genoa and later continued by England, France, and the Low Countries was a direct and predictable result of the broadening of the European economy into mercantilism during this period as well as the concomitant absorption of a number of regions external to Europe into the new “world” system. Within Morocco, starting on a regional basis in the Sus under M’hammad al-Sheikh and later expanding under his successors to the country as a whole, the production of exchangeable commodities, initially stimulated by trade in sugar, became more and more specialized and oriented toward the overseas market. This development was eventually to become institutionalized with the establishment of formal trade in essential commodities under both local and state auspices—a transformation stimulated at first by outside powers, as in the Portuguese royal monopoly for trade in cereals, woven goods, and slaves from Dukkala, but later directed by the Moroccans themselves, such as when the Saʿdid rulers established state-to-state exchanges of the copper and saltpeter needed by Protestant Europe for weapons production.

A direct result of the economic reorientation of Moroccan society during these centuries was a gradual transformation in the nature of the export-oriented

workforce. This occurred locally and almost imperceptibly at first, as small producers combined with indigenous traders and overseas merchants to introduce Dukkala's putting-out system for the weaving of textiles for the sub-Saharan African market. Eventually, the reliance upon a paid labor force in Morocco became more widespread, as state-conducted commerce in sugar and copper from the Sus created large numbers of wage laborers, who extracted and processed the products of plantations and mines. By the accession of Ahmad al-Mansur in 1578, both the nature of production and the administrative structure of Saʿdid Morocco had changed significantly. A distinctive Sharifian state ideology had been formed, backed up by a widespread popular consensus regarding collective identity and forms of political legitimacy, while the Saʿdid *dīwān* in Marrakesh, following precedents already established under M'hammad al-Sheikh, more forcefully continued the latter's policy of converting pastoralists into farmers or wage laborers.¹⁰⁵ These social changes were further enhanced by a formally administered "economic policy" based on the introduction of technologies and methods of production new to the Moroccan social milieu, as well as a redirection of the flow of commodities away from the traditional north-south axes of overland commerce and toward the increasingly cosmopolitan ports along the Atlantic coast.

The case of 16th-century Morocco departs from the assumptions of classical World-Systems theorists in a number of other important respects as well. According to the model of sociopolitical development put forth by Wallerstein and Hopkins, the creation of an entity similar in form and structure to a European nation-state was impossible outside of Europe itself in this period.¹⁰⁶ The multicultural and centralized polities of the non-European world are instead assumed by these theorists to have represented nothing more than the culmination of an archaic process of "empire" building, a term which is evocative of Marx's "Asiatic mode of production" or Samir Amin's "tributary state." Yet in the Moroccan case, one finds that according to numerous criteria, most of which are counted as sufficient indications of "nationhood" even for Wallerstein and Hopkins, the 16th-century Saʿdid *dawla* was beginning to look remarkably like an absolutist state of 17th-century Europe—at least in terms of its ultimate developmental goals. The actual or projected acquisition by Saʿdid Morocco of stable, "internationally" recognized boundaries, territorial contiguity, a common ideology and culture, state control of the means of force, control over geopolitical jurisdiction, control over the means and types of production, control over the circulation of currency, and control over taxation and expenditure¹⁰⁷—all of which, when added together, would signify the existence of a "nation" to many World-Systems theorists—indicates that perhaps these scholars' image of the non-European world or even World-Systems theory itself requires major revision. Indeed, a thorough examination of the Saʿdid state and its political and economic policies up to the end of the first decade of the 17th century, although beyond the scope of the present article, might very well suggest that Europe at the dawn of the mercantile age was not yet so special after all.

Another important implication for the World-Systems argument is the fact that in Morocco "peripheralization" did not necessarily mean that the country had irretrievably fallen into a situation of unequal exchange. That colonial

dependency and unequal exchange characterized Portuguese–Moroccan relations in Dukkala is undeniable, especially since many of the products of this region were used to supply a foreign mercantile network. Yet even in this worst case scenario, colonial dependency did not destroy traditional trade networks or transform all means of production. Quite the contrary, a strong case can be made that, while dominated by Portuguese mercantile interests but not yet under direct Portuguese rule, Dukkala was more prosperous than it had ever been previously or would be in the future, despite the later establishment of Safi as Saʿdid Morocco’s main window on the Atlantic West.¹⁰⁸ The eventual disruption and dislocation of the socioeconomic structure of Dukkala was instead due to the shortsighted and rapacious attitudes of local captains and the Portuguese crown, who could not forgo the easy profits they obtained from slave raiding. As noted earlier, this policy was to have a profoundly injurious effect on the role played by Portuguese Morocco in the West African gold trade, the uninterrupted continuation of which Lisbon had begun to take for granted.

The Saʿdid-controlled territories in the Sus, on the other hand, hardly looked like a dependency of Europe. Although M’hammad al-Sheikh and his advisers clearly oriented the southern regions of Morocco toward the Atlantic Ocean and increased their trade with Europe manyfold, so much so, in fact, that it became one of the main pillars of state income, this new reliance on exports remained firmly on Morocco’s own terms throughout the 16th century. At no time during this period did the country suffer under the burdens of the forced capitulations that were to bedevil 18th- and 19th-century ʿAlawite rulers. Furthermore, again contrary to predictions derived from the World-Systems model, this Saʿdid reliance on foreign trade did not presuppose any lack of indigenous innovation. Quite the contrary, this period of Moroccan history witnessed a revival of inquiry and experimentation somewhat analogous to that experienced by Morocco’s ally Elizabethan England, and stands even today as one of the last great ages of North African technological innovation and intellectual expression.¹⁰⁹ In the field of military science one could even say that for a brief period Morocco had an actual advantage over Europe by creating new military units such as the *jaysh al-asbahiyya* and *ibudraren*, as well as by adapting given technologies in novel ways to local conditions. A lack of appreciation of precisely this point led to the disaster suffered by the Portuguese king Dom Sebastião’s ill-fated expeditionary force at Wadi al-Makhazin in 1578.

The preceding discussion was intended to demonstrate that detailed studies of non-European societies in the 16th century, once accomplished, may bring up problems that will necessitate a revision of the World-Systems approach. It is also clear, however, that the basic tenet of this approach, that external political and economic forces can have profound effects on the internal social relations of a given geographical region, remains valid for the Moroccan case. Yet can one assume it to be equally valid for other 16th-century Islamic societies, such as Safavid Iran or Mughal India? What about the Ottoman Empire under Süleiman the Magnificent? Was Europe really as dominant during this period as Wallerstein and his colleagues seem to suppose? Is it sufficient to dismiss centralized Islamic polities during this period as mere “gunpowder empires,” as Marshall

Hodgson and his successors have done?¹¹⁰ The answers to questions such as these still await the results of further research. It seems safe to assume at the present juncture, however, that no model purporting to explain the origins of the modern world system can be regarded as fully adequate until such work has been completed.

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NOTES

Author's note: Besides the Moroccan historian Ahmed Boucharb, whose work is cited frequently throughout the first part of this article, the author would like to acknowledge his debt to Professor John Hunwick of Northwestern University, whose helpful comments and advice were utilized whenever possible.

¹An exception to this trend can be found in a number of articles written by the Turkish historian Huri Islamoğlu, such as H. Islamoğlu and Çağlar Keyder, "Agenda for Ottoman History," *Review*, 1,1 (Summer, 1977), 31–55; H. Islamoğlu and Suraiya Faroqi, "Agricultural Production Trends in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia," *Review*, 2,3 (Winter, 1979), 401–36. While the 1979 article is a valuable study of the relationship between agricultural production and Anatolian demographics, the 1977 article seems almost polemical in its reliance upon out-of-date evolutionary schemes and Marxist models such as the "Asiatic mode of production." The assumption that all "Asian" states or empires in the early modern period shared the same patrimonial mode of production is, in light of recent anthropological and historical research, overly simplistic to say the least. Furthermore, evidence of a lively and unfettered rural market economy in the Maghrib, whose form remained constant throughout hundreds of years of history, unequivocally demonstrates that the unspoken corollary to Islamoğlu's model—that in a "true" patrimonial society all peasant surpluses necessarily flow to the state—has little relevance to the region being studied in the preceding pages.

²Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, Vol. II: *Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750* (New York, 1980), p. 17.

³Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World In the Age of Philip II* (New York and London, 1973), vol. 2, p. 1195. Attitudes such as these are annoyingly present throughout Braudel's otherwise magisterial work, while socioeconomic and military developments in Morocco are ignored in particular. This great French scholar surprisingly appears to assume that even moderately sized Ottoman fleets and landing parties would have been sufficient to capture the city of Fez in the last two decades of the 16th century—even after the Saʿdid Sultan Ahmad al-Mansur al-Dhahabi had defeated a large Portuguese expeditionary force at Wadi al-Makhazin in 1578 (see, for example, pp. 1179 and 1180).

⁴According to this model, a European-controlled command economy built around "triangular trade" in slave-produced cotton, sugar, tobacco and silver prevailed in the Atlantic while trading posts based on "partnerships" with local merchants characterized European economic activity in the Indian Ocean region. See Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, 2:45–51, where this model is proposed for Dutch commercial activities in the 17th century.

⁵Gomes Eannes de Azurara (fl. 1450), *Conquests and Discoveries of Henry the Navigator: Being the Chronicles of Azurara*, trans. Virginia de Castro e Almeida (London, 1936), pp. 67, 78.

⁶John Vogt, *Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast, 1469–1682* (Athens, Ga., 1979), p. 1.

⁷Azurara, *Chronicles*, pp. 131–32.

⁸Ahmed Boucharb, *Dukkāla wa'l-isti'mār al-Burtughālī ilā ikhlā' Āsafī wa Āzammūr* (Casablanca, 1404/1984), p. 112. A good description of early Ibero-Moroccan trade patterns can be found in al-Sharif al-Idrisi (fl. 548/1154), *Kitāb nuzhat al-mushtāq fī ikhtirāq al-āfāq* [*Description de l'Afrique et de l'Espagne*], ed. and trans. Reinhart Dozy and M. J. De Goeje (Leiden, 1968), pp. 82–84.

⁹Robert Ricard, *Études sur l'histoire des Portugais au Maroc* (Coimbra, Port., 1955), p. 100. Agreements with the town of Safi were continued without change until the end of the 15th century.

¹⁰In but one example of such trade enticements, a certain Moroccan “Qaʿid ʿAbd al-Rahmān” received authorization to exchange one shipload of fabric per year for gold at the *feitoria* of Arguin (ibid., p. 98). Safi’s commercial treaty with Portugal eventually became the stimulus for a call to jihad by the great Sufi sheikh Muhammad ibn Sulayman al-Jazuli, an act that led to the creation of the Saʿdid polity in the Sus.

¹¹The best 16th-century description of Dukkāla remains that of Leo Africanus, whose Arabic name was al-Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Wazzan. His *Description of Africa* (originally written in Italian) can now be consulted in an annotated Arabic translation by the Moroccan historians Muhammad Hajji and Muhammad al-Akhdar. See al-Hasan Ibn Muhammad al-Wazzan al-Gharnati al-Fasi (Johannis Leo Africanus), *Waṣf Ifrīqiyya* (Rabat, 1400/1980), vol. 1, pp. 116–28. For corresponding pages in the more commonly available French translation of this work see also, Jean-Léon l’Africain, *Description de l’Afrique*, trans. A. Epaulard (Paris, 1956), vol. 1, pp. 117–30.

¹²Boucharb, *Dukkāla*, pp. 88–89. Because of similar settlement patterns in Morocco and the pastoral regions of Spain, one is probably safe in applying the coefficient of 4.5 persons per *vecino* (Ar. *kānūn*) to the urban areas of Morocco in general, as Julius Beloch and Fernand Braudel have done for 16th-century Castile. See, Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, 1:395, n. 194. For a description of early 16th-century Azemmour, see also Leo Africanus, *Description*, trans. Epaulard, 1:125–27.

¹³Boucharb, *Dukkāla*, pp. 90–94. Safi was prosperous enough to mint its own gold coins during its period of “independence” from the Marinid state between the years 1460 and 1508. Leo Africanus (*Description*, Epaulard trans., 1:117–21) reports 4,000 dwellings in the city, giving a population of between 18,000–20,000. This figure seems low, inasmuch as Safi is known to have outstripped Azemmour as a commercial center after the end of the 15th century.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁵Ricard, *Portugais au Maroc*, p. 101.

¹⁶Leo Africanus, *Description*, trans. Epaulard, 1:27–28.

¹⁷Carette’s formula, used in Boucharb, *Dukkāla*, is as follows: Tribal population = (Number of Fighters × 1.25) × 3.

¹⁸Boucharb, *Dukkāla*, p. 84.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 134.

²⁰On the history of the Banu Amghar family, see Vincent J. Cornell, “Ribāṭ Tīṭ-n-Fiṭr and the Origins of Moroccan Maraboutism,” *Islamic Studies*, 27, 1 (Spring 1408/1988), pp. 23–36.

²¹Boucharb, *Dukkāla*, p. 137.

²²Ibid., p. 136.

²³For an account of this coup in Safi, see Leo Africanus, *Description*, trans. Epaulard, 1:117–21.

²⁴Boucharb, *Dukkāla*, p. 262.

²⁵Ibid., p. 260. It is interesting to speculate, though difficult to prove, that Yahya-u-Taʿfuṭ’s attempt to create his own *qanūn* was done in conscious imitation of Ottoman precedent. Whatever the case, his action clearly seemed designed to express his formal independence from the Wattasid-Marinid state centered at Fez, the legitimacy of which was based on the allegiance of Maliki jurists.

²⁶Ibid., p. 267. The discrepancy between wheat and barley figures in these assessments is due to the fact that a grain of wheat weighs approximately one-and-one-half times as much as a grain of barley. If taxes had only been assessed in *alqueires*, which is a measure of volume rather than of weight, a farmer making his living from barley would pay two-thirds the tax of one planting wheat.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 267–68.

²⁸In the 16th century a *dawwār* (pl. *adwār*) was a group of 100 to 200 pastoralists whose palm-reinforced goatskin tents were put in a circle as protection against attack. These tents were placed so as to form a continuous wall barring access from the outside and had two openings which were closed at night to keep out lions and other animal or human intruders. For tax purposes it was more common to count tribal populations in *adwār* (as units of production) than in numbers of individuals.

²⁹If a camel load of wheat for tax purposes is 25 *alqueires*, then the assessment for barley, based on figures given in Portuguese sources for commercial loads, should be about 37.5 *alqueires*, or one-and-one-half times the figure for wheat.

³⁰Boucharb, *Dukkāla*, p. 108.

³¹This table represents the author's own calculations of weight based on volume figures given by Boucharb in *ibid.*, pp. 285, 287.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 288, 290.

³³Vogt, *Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast*, p. 76.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 67.

³⁵Boucharb, *Dukkāla*, pp. 111, 304. Vogt (*Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast*, p. 167) reports that at Mina one *hanbal* from Mazouna could be traded for one healthy male slave from Benin.

³⁶Wallerstein, *The Modern World System*, 2:196.

³⁷Boucharb, *Dukkāla*, pp. 110–11. Before the coming of the Banu Hilal Arabs, al-Madina al-Gharbiyya was the largest town in Dukkala and served as the major urban center and marketplace for the sedentary Mashanzaya Berber tribe. It was situated inland from the present coastal resort of Walidiyya (Oualidia), near the modern market town of al-Ithnayn al-Gharbiyya (Tnine El Rharbia). See also, Leo Africanus, *Description*, trans. Epaulard, 1:122. An individual named Maymun, the aged qaʿid of one section of this town, was under arrest for advocating the payment of tribute to the Portuguese when Leo Africanus visited al-Madina al-Gharbiyya in 1515. It is possible that this unfortunate person may have been attempting to revive his community's once profitable *hāʾik* trade.

³⁸Boucharb, *Dukkāla*, p. 309. The table has been changed from the original to show totals for all types of textiles.

³⁹The figures in this table have been taken from *ibid.*, pp. 296–99; Vogt, *Portuguese Rule on the Gold Coast*, p. 218. In order to show standardized weights, the present author has converted Moroccan figures into their equivalent value in Portuguese marks (1 mark = 8 ounces).

⁴⁰Boucharb, *Dukkāla*, pp. 311–15.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 303.

⁴²*Ibid.*, pp. 299–300, 304. The term, *almoxarife* (Ar. *al-musharrif*), is the origin for the English word "sheriff."

⁴³Ricard, *Portugais au Maroc*, p. 157.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 156. In Spanish sources he is known as "Estebánico de Azamor."

⁴⁵Bernard Rosenberger and Hamid Triki, "Famines et épidémies au Maroc aux XVI^e et XVII^e siècles," *Hespéris-Tamuda*, 14 (1973), 129–33.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁴⁷This opinion is held by a number of Moroccan historians, including Hamid Triki (*ibid.*, p. 135) and Ahmed Boucharb (*Dukkāla*, pp. 462–63).

⁴⁸Ricard, *Portugais au Maroc*, pp. 118–19.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 124–27.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 129–32.

⁵¹Muhammad al-Saghir ibn al-Hajj al-Ifrani (fl. late 17th cent.), *Nuzhat al-hādī bi akhbār mulūk al-qarn al-hādī* (Rabat, n.d.), p. 23. Translation by V. J. Cornell.

⁵²On the events leading up to the Spanish conquest of the Canary Islands, see J. M. Gómez-Tabanera, *A Concise History of Spain*, trans. John Inderwick Palmer (Madrid, 1966), pp. 272–73.

⁵³The full name of the site was "Santa Cruz do Cabo de Gué d'Agoa de Narba," from its local name of *Agādīr-n-Arbā'a* (Granary of the Wednesday Market), used by the Masgina Berber tribe. Today it is the Moroccan city and beach resort of Agadir. It is interesting to note that Agadir was occupied the same year that Safi fell under direct Portuguese control.

⁵⁴Anonymous, *Chronique de Santa-Cruz du Cap de Gué (Agadir)*, ed. and trans. Pierre Cenival (Paris, 1934), pp. 23, 155–56. Note that the amount for which the post was sold equaled a little less than four days' transactions at the market of Safi during the same period. This chronicle, the original title of which is *Este he o origem e començo e cabo da villa de Santa Cruz do Cabo de Gué d'Agoa de Narba*, was probably written by a Portuguese knight residing in the town at the time of its capture by the Saʿdids in 1541.

⁵⁵Leo Africanus, *Description*, trans. Epaulard, 1:84–85, 86–87. The Moroccan translators Hajji and al-Akhdar, however, (*Wasf Ifrīqiyya*, 1:75–89), put the total number of warriors from these regions at 120,000, giving a much larger overall population. No explanation is given in this work for its discrepancies with the Epaulard volume, on which it was supposedly based.

⁵⁶Leo Africanus, *Description*, trans. Epaulard, 1:90–96. While existing population estimates, such as those given by Leo Africanus, for the rural areas of the Sus are very inexact, it is clear that these regions contained well over twice the population of urban areas.

⁵⁷Bernard Rosenberger, “Tamdult, cité minière et caravanière presaharienne,” *Hespéris-Tamuda*, 11 (1970), 125.

⁵⁸Leo Africanus, *Wasf Ifrīqiyya*, trans. Hajji and al-Akhdar, 1:114–15. The Epaulard version of the *Description* does not contain the above information. The Moroccan Sufi biographer Ibn ʿAskar (d. 1578) more accurately places the zawīya of Muhammad ibn Mubarak al-Aqqawi near the recently established Portuguese *feitoria* of Massa and describes the institution of weekly “days of Sidi Mʿbarak,” during which fighting was forbidden in the interest of furthering local and regional commerce. See Muhammad ibn ʿAskar al-Hasani, *Dawḥat al-nāshir li mahāsin man kāna biʾl-Maghrib min mashāʾikh al-qarn al-ʿāshir*, ed. Muhammad Hajji (Rabat, 1397/1978), p. 114.

⁵⁹Bernard Rosenberger, “Travaux sur l’histoire du Maroc aux XV^e et XVI^e siècles publiés en Pologne,” *Hespéris-Tamuda*, 12 (1971), 208. Information on the *alfūf* of 16th-century Morocco can be found in a synopsis of Andrzej Dziubinski, “Les Chorfa saadiens dans le Sous et à Marrakech jusqu’en 1525,” *Africana Bulletin*, 10 (1969), 31–51.

⁶⁰Sijilmasa is called an “urban conglomeration” because toward the end of its existence it apparently was more of a densely packed collection of oasis communities than a single, unified city. See Leo Africanus, *Description*, trans. Epaulard, 2:424–25, 428–30.

⁶¹Muhammad Hajji, *al-Ḥaraka al-fikriyya biʾl-Maghrib fīʿahd al-Saʿdiyyīn* (Casablanca, 1396/1976), p. 41.

⁶²The name, “Mʿhammad,” is an Arabized version of the Tashilhit Berber name “Amʿhammad,” which itself is a regional variant of the classical Arabic “Muḥammad.”

⁶³Hajji, *al-Ḥaraka al-fikriyya*, p. 42. The Tagmadart-Zagora region (formerly called “Darʿa”) had long been famous for the production of indigo and was also an entrepôt for gold coming north from the Niger-Senegal region. For a 12th-century description of this collection of oasis communities, see al-Sharif al-Idrisi, *Description de l’Afrique*, p. 61 (Arabic text). The earlier Andalusian geographer al-Bakri (ca. 1068) calls the site *Tiyūmātīn*. See Abu ʿUbayd ʿAbdallah al-Bakri, *al-Mughrib fī dhikr bilād Ifrīqiyya waʾl-Maghrib* [*Description de l’Afrique septentrionale*], trans. MacGuckin de Slane, (reprint ed., Paris, 1965), pp. 155–56, 295–96. On the Zagora region, see also Leo Africanus, *Description*, trans. Epaulard, 2:422–24.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 1:93.

⁶⁵Hajji, *al-Ḥaraka al-fikriyya*, p. 42. See also, al-Ifrani, *Nuzhat al-hādī*, p. 11. For a contemporary Iberian description of Muslim *awliyāʾ*, see Diego de Torres, *Relación del origen y suceso de los xarifes y del estado de los reinos de Marruecos, Fez, y Tarudante*, ed. Mercedes García-Arenal (Madrid, 1980), p. 41 and p. 41, n. 20.

⁶⁶Hajji, *al-Ḥaraka al-fikriyya*, pp. 42–43. For a discussion of the problematical meaning of the title *al-Qāʾim* in Islamic history see Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, *Islamic Messianism* (Albany, N.Y., 1981), pp. 60–64. The assumption, expressed by a number of 17th-century chroniclers of the Saʿdid state, that Sheikh Barakat al-Tidasi was the sole catalyst for the movement begun by Mʿhammad “al-Qaʾim” al-Zaydani, appears to have been due to confusion between the names “Barakat” (ibn Muḥammad al-Tidasi) and “Mʿbarak” (Mʿhammad ibn, al-Aqqawi). Further confusion was added by the fact that the initial *bayʿa* to this movement was held at Tidsi, rather than at the latter’s zawīya near Massa.

⁶⁷Although conventional wisdom attributes the origins of the name “Saʿdid” to the Filali Sharifs of Sijilmasa, who used it to disparage the reputation of their rivals in the Sus by claiming that the latter were descended from the tribe of Banu Saʿd ibn Bakr rather than from the Prophet himself, recent evidence indicates that the term was also used by the Banu Zaydan Sharifs themselves as a means of stressing their ties to the Jazuliyya Sufi order. In this case, the Arabic term *Saʿdi* would be a corrupted attributive version of *Ahl al-Saʿāda* (Those Who Are Happy), a common phrase used for Sufi adepts in the western Maghrib. See Vincent J. Cornell, “Mirrors of Prophethood: the Evolving Image of the Spiritual Master in the Western Maghrib from the Origins of Sufism to the End of the Sixteenth Century” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1989), pp. 520, 523, 591 (on al-Jazuli’s use of the concept, “happiness”), pp. 616–23 (on the Jazulite Sufi as a sociopolitical

exemplar), pp. 669–72 (on the ambivalent relationship between the Jazuliyya order and the Saʿdid state). Another opinion on this matter has been advanced by the Moroccan historian ʿAbd al-Karīm Krim, who notes that the first Saʿdid ruler to use this term to designate his state was Mʿhammad al-Sheikh's son ʿAbdallah al-Ghalib Bi'llah (d. 1574) and assumes it to have been a propagandistic device describing the "happiness" of Moroccans at their salvation from European domination and corrupt local rulers. See ʿAbd al-Karīm Krim, *al-Maghrib fī ʿahd al-dawla al-saʿdiyya* (Casablanca, 1398/1978), p. 40.

⁶⁸Rosenberger, "Travaux," p. 208. See also Anonymous, *Chronique de Santa-Cruz*, p. 35.

⁶⁹Andrzej Dziubinski, "L'armée et la flotte de guerre marocaines à l'époque des sultans de la dynastie saadienne," *Hespéris-Tamuda*, 13 (1972), 82. This flag was eventually to develop into the famous white banner ("de razo blanco bordado de oro") containing Qurʾanic verses embroidered in golden thread that accompanied the armies of Ahmad al-Mansur al-Dhahabi (the "Golden Conqueror").

⁷⁰Anonymous, *Chronique de Santa-Cruz*, pp. 45, 77. Mʿhammad al-Sheikh is also reported to have said that he would never break "his word or his lance" (ibid., p. 45).

⁷¹Ibid., p. 89, np. 92–93. The Saʿdid ruler Mʿhammad al-Sheikh's taste for things and people that were European apparently extended to women as well. After conquering Santa Cruz do Cabo de Gué in 1541, he fell madly in love with Doña Mecía (or Mencía) de Monroy, the blond daughter of the defeated town's Castilian captain. She eventually converted to Islam, took the name ʿAliyya (the "Exalted"), and lived as the Sharif's favorite until succumbing to childbed fever in 1545 or 1546. Until the day he died, Mʿhammad al-Sheikh continued to regard Doña Mecía's father, Don Gutierrez de Monroy, as his father-in-law, even after the latter had been repatriated to Spain (ibid., p. 141). See also, Torres, *Relación*, pp. 113–14.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 73–75.

⁷³Dziubinski, "L'armée," 71, 73.

⁷⁴Since the cannon is usually regarded as more of a phallic than a vaginal symbol, it is worth noting that "Sīdī Mīmūn" (rather than "Lālla Mīmūna," who most often acts as a playful succubus) is a name that has long been given to one of the seven kings of the jinn (and commander of their hosts in battle) throughout all regions of North Africa. Since jinn are also mentioned in the Qurʾan as having been created from fire ("smokeless fire," however, quite unlike early bombards: Qurʾan, 55 ["al-Rahmān"]: 15), one might wonder whether or not 16th-century Portuguese chroniclers mistook the *jiniyya Mīmūna* for her more virile and powerful "relative." On the names of jinn and their attributes see Edmond Doutté, *Magie et religion dans l'Afrique du Nord* (reprint ed., Paris, 1984), pp. 119–22. On *Lālla Mīmūna*, see Vincent Crapanzano, *The Hamadsha, A Study in Moroccan Ethnopsychiatry* (Berkeley, Calif., 1973), p. 148.

⁷⁵Dziubinski, "L'armée," 72. See also Anonymous, *Chronique de Santa-Cruz*, pp. 89, 97–99.

⁷⁶Dziubinski, "L'armée," 67, 70–71, 72–73, 78.

⁷⁷A view somewhat similar to that outlined above has been advanced by the Nigerian politician and historian Dahiru Yayha in *Morocco in the Sixteenth Century, Problems and Patterns in African Foreign Policy* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1981), where he characterizes Mʿhammad al-Sheikh's external political relations as being governed by a pragmatic, early-modern form of realpolitik that grew out of supposed ideological, politico-religious, and ethnic differences between Saʿdid Morocco and the Ottoman state (pp. 8, 12–16). Yahya's view differs in significant respects from that of the present author, however, in that he seems to deny any long-term planning or consistency to the "Atlantic" policy followed by all Saʿdid rulers through Ahmad al-Mansur and assumes that Morocco's overall orientation toward Europe was the creation, not of Mʿhammad al-Sheikh, but of his son and successor, ʿAbdallah al-Ghalib, who hoped to disentangle his country "from its overt 'Maghrebism'" (p. 34).

⁷⁸L. Mougin, "Les premiers sultans saʿdides et le Sahara," *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée*, 19 (1975), 171–72.

⁷⁹Daniel Eustache, "Les ateliers monétaires du Maroc," *Hespéris-Tamuda*, 11 (1970), 97–98. Mʿhammad al-Sheikh eventually found himself compelled to exert direct authority over the trade routes leading to eastern Morocco as well, a necessity which resulted in his occupation of the salt-pan of Taghaza in 1556.

⁸⁰Krim, *al-Maghrib fī ʿahd al-dawla al-saʿdiyya*, pp. 65–66.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 45. It is interesting and probably not coincidental that the Saʿdid political movement had its beginnings in Tidsi and that the influential Genoese convert Yahya al-ʿIlj, a major landowner in the region, was to become governor of Tiyyut for Mʿhammad al-Sheikh.

⁸²Rosenberger, “Travaux,” 213. General information on the 16th-century Moroccan sugar industry can be found in a synopsis of Andrzej Dziubinski, “Cukrownictwo marokanske w latach, 1516–1623,” *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, 78 (1971), contained in *ibid.*, 269–86.

⁸³Rosenberger, “Travaux,” pp. 213–14. The overall prosperity and ample population of the Sus during the 16th century appears to have been partly the result of successful food distribution policies undertaken by the Saʿdid administration during famine years with the help of their allies, the sheikhs of the Jazuliyya Sufi order. The Spaniard Diego de Torres, who was present with Mʿhammad al-Sheikh at his court in Taroudant between the years 1546 and 1550, reports that the Sharif and his administrators “spared neither their effort nor their expense to provide necessities of life at a reasonable price.” See Rosenberger and Triki, “Famines et épidémies,” 126.

⁸⁴Paul Berthier, “Recherches archéologiques à la Zaouïa Bel Moqaddem,” *Hespéris-Tamuda*, 11 (1970), 141–69.

⁸⁵Henri de Castries, ed., *Les sources inédites de l’histoire du Maroc*, première série, *Dynastie saadienne (Angleterre)*, (Paris, 1918), vol. 1, p. 186.

⁸⁶“The Sherief, as the saieng goith here, hath lately usurped into his hands both the kingdome of Fez and sundrie other Estats of Barbary; and being thereby growne to great power, he is not a little feared in Spaine, speciallie because he hath in rediness a gret armie of both horsemen and footmen, and preparith sundre vessells, wherewith it is supposed he mindeth to passe into Spain” (Francis Yaxlee to William Cecil, June 7, 1549), *ibid.*, p. 11.

⁸⁷Ibid., pp. 14–20.

⁸⁸“The king of the country [Morocco] hath offred to gyve fyve kyntalls of gonne mettall for every kyntall of tynne that shalbe brought him. . . .” (William Paget to Henry VIII, February 2, 1543), *ibid.*, p. 8.

⁸⁹Rosenberger and Triki, “Famines et épidémies,” 141, n. 98. The famines, epidemics, and battles that devastated parts of northern and central Morocco between the years 1515 and 1545 left most of the Sus untouched, largely because of the Saʿdid food distribution policies mentioned above. The resulting population advantage enjoyed by Mʿhammad al-Sheikh in his home region, when combined with the technological and administrative advances already possessed by the Saʿdids, greatly eased his conquest of the rest of Morocco.

⁹⁰Examples of the prevailing lack of concern or ignorance about Saʿdid Morocco’s maritime capabilities can be found in Yahya, *Morocco in the Sixteenth Century*; Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period* (Cambridge, Eng., 1987), and even in the Moroccan Abdallah Laroui’s, *The History of the Maghrib, An Interpretive Essay* (Princeton, N.J., 1977), none of which mention this factor in the Banu Zaydan rulers’ plans for Morocco’s development. Among historians dealing generally with this period only Krim (*al-Maghrib fī ʿahd al-dawla al-saʿdiyya*, pp. 243–45) mentions the existence of a Moroccan fleet.

⁹¹Krim, *al-Maghrib fī ʿahd al-dawla al-saʿdiyya*, p. 243.

⁹²Luis de Loureiro to João III, September 10, 1537. De Castries, *Les sources inédites*, première série, *Dynastie saadienne (Portugal)*, 1:106–13.

⁹³Dziubinski, “L’armée,” 91–92.

⁹⁴Ibid., 92–93.

⁹⁵De Castries, *Les sources inédites, première série (Angleterre)*, 1:100–106.

⁹⁶Krim, *al-Maghrib fī ʿahd al-dawla al-saʿdiyya*, p. 70.

⁹⁷Mʿhammad al-Sheikh’s disdain for Ottoman pretensions at ruling the Muslim world was also shared by his son Ahmad al-Mansur, who considered them to be “a group of slaves and lackeys whom God has imposed upon the Muslims” (*ibid.*, p. 229). The preceding quotation comes from the account of ʿAli al-Tamgruti, Moroccan ambassador to the Sublime Porte, who wrote a travel memoir entitled, *al-Nafahāt al-miskiyya fī l-sifāra al-turkiyya*.

⁹⁸Hajji, *al-Ḥaraka al-fikriyya*, p. 49.

⁹⁹The concept of “imperium,” in which accumulation is furthered by the mercantile elites of dominant, “central” states via the securing of low-cost sources of supplies in “peripheral” areas and

obtaining a high market value for their products in return, was clearly applicable to 16th-century Morocco, albeit in a limited sense. Although Sa^cdid trade agreements with European countries were favorable enough during this period to elicit considerable grumbling from foreign merchants wishing even greater profit margins (see, for example, de Castries, *Sources inédites, première série [Angleterre]*, p. 539), Morocco continued to rely on the exchange of raw materials for finished products (tin, framed timber, small firearms, body armor, oars, stain, wire, tents, and "bernatha" cloth from England alone) and expertise from abroad. For a discussion of the "imperium" concept, see Terrence K. Hopkins, "The Study of the Capitalist World-Economy: Some Introductory Considerations," in Terrence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: Theory and Methodology* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1983), p. 13. Needless to say, it is assumed in the preceding discussion that Moroccan trade with Europe was not merely the "disposition of irregular surpluses" or the "making up of irregular shortages," but rather entailed "a continuing link between two serially related production processes," where "the end product of one may be the raw material of the other . . . or the finished product of one may be a tool of the other . . . or the product of one may provide . . . staple means of subsistence for the labor of the other" (p. 36).

¹⁰⁰In the case of Dukkala, however, it must be noted that the region's "peripheralization" was somewhat indirect, since the majority of its agricultural surpluses and export-oriented textile production were sent to Portuguese Africa rather than to Iberia itself. This fact does not, however, imply any lessening in Dukkala's dependence on market relations over which its merchants had no control.

¹⁰¹See Hopkins and Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis*, pp. 62–63.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁰³Abd al-^cAziz al-Fishtali, the "official" court historian for Ahmad al-Mansur, intimated that the Moroccan conquest of Songhay in 1590 was not for the purpose of seizing gold in and of itself, but had the wider aim of utilizing the commodities of sub-Saharan Africa in a projected jihad against Spain: "And today he . . . is resolved to increase the fleets, desirous of jihad and victory over the enemy of religion . . . profuse in number [of men] and resources . . . by what fell to his conquering sword in the subjugation of the Sudanese kingdoms, whose plentiful produce and gold mines are destined for an increase in expenditure that fears neither poverty nor want; while the great, coveted blackness of its slaves will power the heavy oars of the fleets like the beating, speeding, and soaring wings of birds . . . until the land of Andalus is conquered to its furthest reaches . . ." Abu Faris ^cAbd al-^cAziz al-Fishtali, *Manāhil al-ṣafā fī ma'āthir mawālāynā al-shurafā'*, ed. ^cAbd al-Karim Krim (Rabat, 1974), p. 197.

¹⁰⁴The term, "protocapitalist," used above, is borrowed from Alejandro Portes and John Walton, *Labor, Class and the International System* (Orlando, Fla., 1981), who regard "absolutist states and mercantilist trade as protocapitalist formations leading to the gradual demise of a feudal mode of production" (p. 12). The present author, however, differs from these scholars in that he does not consider 16th-century Morocco to have been a feudal society.

¹⁰⁵Al-Fishtali discusses at length the forced settlement of certain Banu Hilal tribes in "homelands" with clearly defined boundaries. Recalcitrant tribes would have their horses taken away and would be guarded by semisedentary tribal fractions allied with the state (^c*Arab al-Dawla*), such as the Awlad Muṭa^c of the Sus (al-Fishtali, *Manāhil*, pp. 108–11). The most vivid description of landless tribespeople being reduced to sharecropping and wage labor comes from the same source, which details the reduction of Banu Hilal tribal segments in the region of Anfa: "Their possessions and their cattle were swept away, so they satisfied themselves with grains and fodder for food. Next, all their lawfully and unlawfully [obtained possessions] were confiscated and their houses and tents were torn down—this was all that remained to the rogues—and they retreated into the open country, barefoot, naked, and hungry, as if struck senseless by the shock of a thunderclap. Then they were spit forth throughout the land, scattered about in the occupations of digging ditches, sheep herding, and plowing for the fifth, begging from the populace . . ." (p. 193).

¹⁰⁶Hopkins and Wallerstein, "Structural Transformations of the World-Economy," in *World-Systems Analysis*, pp. 126–33.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p. 133.

¹⁰⁸Corroboration for this point of view can be found in Charles L. Redman's recently published monograph on the Moroccan–American archaeological excavations at al-Qasr al-Saghir, a minor port on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco between the cities of Ceuta and Tangier. Redman

concludes that the town's period of greatest prosperity and population size occurred between the years 1350 and 1458, when it existed as an entity autonomous from the Marinid state, yet nearly totally dependent on trade with Muslim Granada and southern Europe. See Charles L. Redman, *Qsar es-Seghir, An Archaeological View of Medieval Life* (Orlando, Fla., 1986), pp. 41–43.

¹⁰⁹ “[Then] came the rule of the Commander of the Faithful [Ahmad al-Mansur] . . . who rejected imitation, expanded innovation and invention, and pursued the deduction of the unknown from the known (*qīyās al-mashāhid ‘alā al-ghayb*) . . . and the effects [of this policy] came forth with overwhelming success—the exaltation of industry, the rule of civilization, the sophistication of invention and innovation, the increase of capability, and greatness of form. There is no comparison between [this age] and what preceded it . . . the situation of these modern times is one of miracles beyond the understanding of mankind . . . [it is a period of] the powers of philosophical acuity and impulse as well as feats of engineering . . . ” (al-Fishtali, *Manāhil*, p. 209).

¹¹⁰ See Marshall G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, Vol. III: *The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times* (Chicago and London, 1974), pp. 17–22. Hodgson's term, “Gunpowder Empire,” has two unfortunate implications when applied to the economic, administrative, and technological transformations occurring in the Muslim world after the mid-15th century. First of all, as an “ideal type” it gives too great an importance to the role of military technology in the eventual geopolitical “success” or “failure” of Islamic states in their competition with Europe. Such a point of view minimizes the effects of other structural changes (such as those described earlier), unrelated to the use of gunpowder armies, that took place during this period. Second, the use of this term continues to perpetuate the Eurocentric bias discussed in the introduction to this article by implying that Muslim states, unable to innovate for themselves, had to rely solely on borrowed technology and expertise in order to play “catch-up” with the kingdoms of Europe, which, by comparison, are made to appear more progressive than their non-European counterparts. On the contrary, the successful outcome of Saʿdid Morocco's conflict with Portugal clearly demonstrates that Muslim states, given a flexible administrative outlook and sufficient resources, were quite competent to take care of themselves. This lesson, however, is entirely lost on Hodgson, who excludes Saʿdid Morocco from his grand march through Islamic history and, with scant regard for factual detail, deterministically concludes that the “economic base of the Sharīfian empire, isolated between the Atlantic and the Sahara, was not great enough to sustain its forces and rebuild its conquests” (p. 19).